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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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10 SEPTEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT
ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC JOURNAL ON EUREKA PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

HK201043 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI IN Chinese No 15, 1 Aug 86 p 15

[Article by Zhen Xian: "New Progress in the 'Eureka' Program"]

[Text] "Our move has begun and we are gaining momentum." This was said by British Secretary of Trade and Industry Channon on the "Eureka" program at the third ministerial conference on the program. On 30 June, 40 foreign ministers and ministers in charge of industry and scientific research from 19 countries in Western Europe gathered in London and further promoted the "Eureka" program. This conference achieved new positive achievements on the basis of the Paris conference held in July 1985 and the Hanover conference held in November 1985. First, the conference admitted Iceland as a new member, so that the program's number of participating countries increased to 19. Second, the 62 cooperative projects adopted by the conference exceeded the previous 10 in terms of quantity, intensiveness, and extensiveness. These new projects mainly involve such areas as information, robots, new materials, biological technology, and so on. Some large projects are the "Prometheus" project to develop "computerized traffic systems," the "EAST" project to develop "software that can produce software," and so on. It is expected that the investment sum needed totals 2 billion European currency units (about \$2 billion). Third, the conference found sources for part of the funds from the governments. France decided to provide 350 million francs this year. It also promised to increase the amount by 100 percent next year and to provide 1 billion francs each year after 1987. Britain announced that it would provide 10 million pounds annually to the program. The FRG decided that between now and 1995, it would provide 500 million marks annually to the program. Fourth, it established a 7-member permanent Secretariat, which will be located in Brussels. Xavier Fels, the conference also adopted the procedure for implementing the cooperative projects: All participating countries should deliver to the Secretariat projects worked out by themselves and adopted by their governments. Other countries should propose within 45 days their opinions on participating in the projects. In addition, the conference decided to hold the next ministerial conference on "Eureka" in Stockholm in December.

The "Eureka" program has achieved this progress mainly because: First, the West European countries have strengthened their "sense of being part of Europe." Last year, Mitterrand proposed this program mainly because he did not want Europe to become the "processing factory" of the United States and Japan in the area of new technology. Over the year, the West European countries' feelings of exerting themselves in science and technology grew stronger. French press commented on this London conference and said: "Eureka" is mainly a reflection of European thinking. It shows that the Europeans are not willing just to play a support role in a world in which technology grows at a tremendous speed.

Thatcher said in her opening speech: If we fail in this program, we shall face a prospect in which the world's market of high technological products may be monopolized by the United States and Japan. Originally, Britain was not so enthusiastic about the "Eureka" program. But it took a more active role at this conference, and decided to participate in 28 of the 62 projects.

West Germany was also more active than before, and decided to take part in 19 projects. France is the sponsor of the program. After a change of French Government in March this year, the Chirac administration continued to actively promote this program. It sent the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of industry, and the minister of scientific research to attend the conference. It also pledged that France would support this program with its financial efforts.

Second, the United States encountered difficulties in its "Strategic Defense Initiative." After the accident of space shuttle "Challenger" in January this year, public opinion held that this setback smashed the "technological myth" of the United States. The progress of the project was postponed, and people felt doubt about it. Therefore, European entrepreneurs became more interested in the civilian "Eureka" program. Third, the United States sets harsh terms for foreign nations that participate in the "Strategic Defense Initiative." There are rigid regulations on project items that are open to the participating enterprises, as well as on sharing the technological achievements. Thus, the actual benefits gained by foreign enterprises are very limited. On the contrary, the "Eureka" program is much more favorable. It adopts a flexible and diversified mode of cooperation, and the participating enterprises can choose freely their favorable project items. Be it a large- or small-scale one, there is no restriction on the share and target of cooperation. Therefore, all large, medium-sized, and small enterprises can gain benefits from this. Originally, some small countries such as the Benelux countries were afraid that the program would be under the control of large countries and they would share only little benefits. But the London conference put their mind at ease.

The London conference showed once again that the "Eureka" program reflects the interests and needs of European countries. With more countries participating in the program, it will make constant progress. It can be envisaged that scientific and technological cooperation will gradually become an important area helping promote the unity of Europe. Of course, it is not an easy thing for quite a number of countries and their enterprises to cooperate with each other for the sake of this goal. In order to turn the research achievements into industry's "European brand" products that can compete with those from the United States and Japan, the European countries must solve many problems. Through scientific and technological cooperation, Western Europe will make progress while overcoming the difficulties.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON EXPERTS' TALKS IN MOSCOW

TASS Announcement

LD061735 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 6 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, 6 Aug (TASS)--Soviet-U.S. working consultations on the level of experts on questions of space and nuclear weapons are to take place in Moscow 11-12 August.

These consultations are being held as preparation for the forthcoming meeting between the USSR foreign affairs minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

White House Statement

LD071150 Moscow TASS in English 1134 GMT 7 Aug 86

[Text] Washington, 7 Aug (TASS)--The White House has circulated a statement which reports the coming meeting of Soviet and U.S. experts in Moscow on 11 August to negotiate the problem of nuclear and space weapons. The U.S. delegation includes Max Kampelman, Edward Rowny, Paul Nitze, Ronald Lehman, Maynard Glittman, Richard Perle and Robert Linbard.

AFP: 'Strict Secrecy'

AU111043 Paris AFP in English 1037 GMT 11 Aug 86

[Pierre Lesourd report]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug (AFP)--U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks on nuclear and space weapons opened here Monday in strict secrecy.

The Soviet media did not announce their start at 10 a.m., nor did it report the arrival Sunday of the U.S. delegation headed by Paul Nitze, President Ronald Reagan's special adviser on arms control.

Other U.S. delegates included Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defence; Edward Rowny, presidential adviser on disarmament and Washington's three negotiators at Geneva--Max Kampelman, Ronald Lehman and Maynard Glitman.

The four-man Soviet delegation, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, is headed by Viktor Karpov, the chief Soviet arms negotiator who is also head of the ministry's new department "responsible for arms limitation and disarmament questions."

The talks are being held in a Foreign Ministry guest villa on the outskirts of Moscow, according to a Western diplomatic source.

They are scheduled to last two days, but a Soviet source said "if the delegations wish, they can go on for a third day."

It is the first time since Mr Reagan became president that the main U.S. arms control and disarmament negotiations have come to Moscow.

The Soviets have opted for a low profile, and no leader went to Moscow airport to greet the delegation, which is staying in one of Moscow's foremost hotels like a group of visiting businessmen.

The day they arrived, the political commentator of the government daily IZVESTIYA stressed in a televised debate that the question of a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit was still "an open question" and that neither Moscow nor Washington could say when it might take place.

The commentator warned against excessive optimism, and criticised "the American press which is trying to create the impression that the United States has gone halfway towards the Soviet Union, in preparation for a summit."

But, he added, Mr Reagan's latest letter on arms control to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did not raise hopes that a meeting could be scheduled.

These technical negotiations come as a decision is still awaited from the Kremlin's on whether it will renew a nuclear test moratorium which ran out 6 August.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa said last Wednesday that when making its decision the Soviet Union would "take into account its estimate of how seriously the United States will discuss a halt to nuclear tests."

AFP on 2nd Day

AU120750 Paris AFP in English 0741 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 12 Aug (AFP)--U.S. and Soviet arms control experts Tuesday entered a second day of talks on nuclear and space weapons aimed at paving the way for a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit, with the U.S. team scheduled to head back to Washington later in the day.

The head of the seven-man American team, Paul Nitze, who is President Ronald Reagan's special adviser on arms control, again described the talks as "serious" when he posed briefly for photographers with the rest of the delegation outside their Moscow hotel on Tuesday morning.

Mr Nitze, who refused to be drawn further on how the talks were going, did however say the venue--an isolated government villa outside town--was "appropriate."

He said the team expected to return to the United States the same day.

On Tuesday the Soviet media had still made no mention of the presence of the American team in Moscow.

12 August Press Briefing

LD121338 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1307 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, 12 Aug (TASS) -- Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, has said that the present consultations between Soviet and U.S. experts on questions of space and nuclear armaments have been brought about by the need to give extra impetus to the discussion of those issues under consideration at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. The consultations, which began on 11 August, are being conducted within the framework of preparations for a meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, he said at a briefing today for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The Soviet delegation is headed by Viktor Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry directorate for problems of arms limitation and disarmament; the delegation comprises Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov; Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and Detinov, a staff member of the USSR Foreign Ministry apparatus. The U.S. delegation is headed by Paul Nitze.

The meeting is taking place in a cottage belonging to the USSR Foreign Ministry in Meshcherino near Moscow, Gennadiy Gerasimov said.

The work was continued this morning, and there are plans to complete the meeting today, the Foreign Ministry representative said.

Gennadiy Gerasimov noted that other meetings between Soviet and U.S. experts are envisaged in the framework of the preparations for the meeting of the foreign ministers. For example, meetings will take place to discuss regional problems and questions of bilateral relations. A group to discuss bilateral relations has flown to Washington today, he said.

Speaking about the "confidentiality" that Washington favors, Gennadiy Gerasimov declared that for "us, confidentiality is no problem." But, he said, confidentiality is a problem for the U.S. side. He cited the statement by Patrick Buchanan, representative of the White House, that the U.S. delegation does not intend to make concessions and give up the implementation of SDI. "Statements like this undermine the U.S. thesis about the confidentiality of the talks," Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed.

The Soviet Union, he said, does not have its own Strategic Defense Initiative, we don't have an SDI, but an SPI -- a strategic peace initiative, aimed at nuclear disarmament by 2000.

14 August Press Briefing

PM151525 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on current issues of international life was held on 14 August at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, who spoke at the briefing, said that at the consultations between Soviet and American experts on space and nuclear arms that have ended in Moscow, agreement was reached to hold a second round of the meeting in Washington. It will then doubtless be justified to sum up the results and make assessments.

The meetings are taking place by way of preparations for the Soviet-American talks due to be held in September at the level of foreign ministers.

The USSR's line on these questions is clear -- we are resolutely in favor of accords with the United States which would prevent an arms race in space and stop it on earth. The Soviet side is prepared to seek paths to mutually acceptable solutions. This is the aim of the compromise proposals submitted by us, which were spoken of in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 16 June of this year.

Answering a question about the confidentiality of the talks, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that the subject of the talks in itself is no secret. One can also understand the desire of the sides taking part in the talks to avoid hasty polemics. This carries the danger of the problem being taken out of the sphere of the quest for a diplomatic compromise and into the field of struggle for transient propaganda victories. That is one aspect. On the other hand, confidentiality can be abused and offers the opportunity additionally to play to the public. For instance, assessments could be made that do not accord with what is happening, and it is possible to present matters in a light more favorable to yourself.

At the same time it is a very serious matter, since what is being discussed is not some isolated Soviet-American joint interest, but all humanity's problem of preventing nuclear catastrophe. So the internationalization of the discussion of this topic is inevitable.

It is also important to correctly see the place our contacts with the United States -- including talks on nuclear arms -- hold in the general context of the USSR's foreign policy. We do not see the world solely from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations, although, of course, we attach great significance to their state and nature. Soviet foreign policy is based on the need to develop and deepen good-neighborliness and cooperation with all states that reciprocate.

Comment on Confidentiality

LD141302 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 GMT 14 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, 14 Aug (TASS) -- The working meeting held near Moscow with the representatives of the United States and devoted to the questions of nuclear and space arms was held as part of the preparations for the meeting between the USSR foreign

minister and the U.S. secretary of state, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. We are resolutely in favor of accords that would ensure that the arms race in space is averted and the arms race on earth halted, he said today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. The Soviet side is ready to search for mutually acceptable solutions. The compromise proposals we made, the so-called intermediate variant, were directed precisely toward this. It would be premature to sum up the results of the deliberations that have taken place. Both sides have agreed that a second round of consultations will be held, this time in Washington, said Gennadiy Gerasimov.

Replying to a question about the confidentiality of the talks, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that the subject matter of the talks is not in itself secret. The matter, however, is a very serious one, since what is under discussion is not some kind of an isolated Soviet-U.S. matter of interest, but the interest of all mankind in the problem of averting a nuclear disaster -- and this concerns everyone. Everyone has the right to voice his opinion on this subject. An internationalization of the examination of this problem is simply unavoidable.

U.S. SDI Stance Hit

LD171744 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Aug 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer]

[Text] Will the new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting take place this year. For understandable reasons this question is attracting the most fixed attention throughout the world. But as yet there is no simple answer to this question, or at least I do not yet know the answer. There are arguments for and against, but so far, let me repeat, it is difficult to say how things will turn out in the end.

The Soviet line in this area is perfectly clear. We are in favor of a meeting that will make it possible to resolve some of the political problems that have accumulated and that will constitute a real step forward in improving Soviet-U.S. relations.

The range of issues connected with a possible meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan will be discussed in September in Washington. Comrade Shevardnadze will also attend. And of course one of the most important issues is disarmament. On the whole each one of us has an understanding of what is under discussion and why the task of disarmament is so topical and urgent, the task of reducing the level of militarization of humanity that currently exists. Well then, it seems useful to represent the problem in a graphic manner. Last Friday I received a poster from Switzerland. Let me show it to you. Here it is. Look at the little red square in the middle and at the white dot there. It symbolizes the might of all the bombs, mines and shells that were used during World War II. All the other dots in the black squares that you see represent the potential for destruction currently at the disposal of mankind. [Video shows a poster with the English title "Tale of the Dots." It shows a grid with 11 squares on the horizontal plane and 11 on the vertical. The square in the middle of the grid is red with one white dot. The remaining squares apart from one near the top left-hand corner, which is also red, are all black, each with many white dots. Just look at how much that potential is in excess of the one dot you saw in the red square. We are now living in such a terrible world; on this mountain of weaponry. Furthermore, in order to destroy all civilization, all life on

earth, it would be enough to use only the capacity encapsulated in just one of these little squares. That is the sort of bleak world we are living in and therefore, let me repeat, something must be done, something really must be done in order to transfer disarmament into a reality.

And so, in order to somehow speed up the talks in Geneva and to improve the general atmosphere, we proposed holding informal working consultations in Moscow for experts on disarmament matters. These consultations took place on Monday and Tuesday near Moscow at (Damidovskaya) dacha in Meshcherino. Overall the Americans sent a first-class team. But the U.S. papers report some rather curious details about how this team was made up. First, Paul Nitze was going to come. He is now chief adviser to Reagan and Shultz on arms control. He was to be accompanied by Max Kampelman, leader of the U.S. delegation in Geneva. But there are people in Washington who see even Paul Nitze was being almost a dove. He might suddenly give in to the Russian here in Moscow, he might suddenly show some sort of softness. So Weinberger insisted that his deputy, superhawk Richard Perle, be included in the group. Then, according to the press, on the initiative of the CIA director they added General Edward Rowney, retired, and later added Colonel Robert Linhard from the National Security Council.

In all only seven people came. This is what Michael Gordon had to say in THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The large U.S. delegation is a symptom of the profound disagreements and mutual distrust within the administration.

The talks in Meshcherino were strictly confidential but to judge by all accounts there was what one might call an unhampered quest for ideas and approaches within the framework of the proposals contained in the letters written by Gorbachev to Reagan and by Reagan to Gorbachev.

When the U.S. experts returned to Washington they said that the consultations had been serious, businesslike and frank. Translated from diplomatic language to everyday language that means there was no rapprochement in positions. Well, in fact it is not difficult to imagine that, for example, they discussed problems of star wars there. Indeed, it is also not difficult to imagine that the position of the U.S. experts, like that of Americans in general, still leaves no room for compromise.

In bidding farewell, so to speak, to these experts, Patrick Buchanan, director of communications at the White House, stated in an interview to U.S. television -- and I will read his statement: The U.S. delegation has gone not to give in on SDI. It has gone to Moscow in order to safeguard its future. On the agenda at present there are only the following questions: Who will set up strategic defense and who will develop [razvertyvat] this system. Will the United States be first to develop [razvertyvat] it or will the Soviet Union overtake it, or will the United States and the USSR develop [razvertyvat] it together as the President is proposing. That is all there is to it. That is your lot, as they say.

Either you can join us in putting combat systems into space or we will do it without you and against you. That is how the American pose the question and there is not even a hint here of any attempt at understanding our logic and our position, the sense of which is rejection of the militarization of space.

U.S. 'Maneuvering' Criticized

PM211539 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 86 First Edition p. 5

[B. Dmitriyev article: "To Come to the Point"]

[Text] A feature of international life today is the marked activation of dialogue between Moscow and the capitals of many states on various aspects of the general situation in the world and questions of bilateral relations. All this is extremely important. The way to overcome the impasses of confrontation lies through dialogues and contacts, discussions and talks. That is the only way to break the ice of mutual distrust and achieve practical results.

The series of working meetings between Soviet and American experts has its place in the process of international dialogue. They are being held by way of preparation for the talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz, which, under the agreement, are to take place in Washington 19-20 September. The idea of creating a suitable machinery for preparing for the ministers' meeting was proposed by us. Washington accepted it.

Now the machinery has begun to operate, several consultations have already taken place, and more will soon follow. The two sides' representatives are exchanging opinions on the state of affairs in specific spheres of Soviet-American relations. Ideas are put forward on opportunities for progress toward the resolution of unsolved problems. In a word, work is in progress, and its results will be summed up at the ministers' meeting.

At all the meetings held thus far, Soviet experts have demonstrated the readiness for constructive discussion and for mutually acceptable solutions to the questions under discussion. It is easy to understand why the world public focused special attention on the consultations held in Moscow the other day on problems of nuclear and space arms. The USSR's line here is unequivocal -- we are resolutely in favor of accords with the United States that would stop the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The second round of consultations is to be held in Washington in early September. Then, naturally, it will be possible to speak of the results and give an appropriate assessment of the exchange of opinions. For the time being, we must wait patiently, however curious we may be to find out what is happening at the discussion table, since from the outset the sides agreed that the expert consultations would be of a purely business nature and would take place, so to speak, behind closed doors.

Unfortunately certain figures in Washington cannot restrain themselves, or rather, will not. The meeting had hardly ended when representatives of the administration started issuing all kinds of commentaries at official briefings and in private. Once again stories and rumors began to pour out under the well established Washington system of "leaking" information.

The exchange of opinions on questions of nuclear and space arms is viewed with deliberate prejudice in Washington, and a forced tone of cheerfulness prevails firmly. The idea being pushed is that the "new American proposals" set forth in the U.S. President's letter to the Soviet leader are "working." That an agreement, if these proposals are followed, is "within reach." That the most important thing is not to hinder the administration, which is supposedly moving in the right direction on arms questions.

Yet, to come to the point, the American position contains little that is good and more than enough that is unsatisfactory. Take space, for instance: Washington continues to persist in the desire to deploy strike arms there.

What is the purpose of the new wave of "leaks"? It is to foist on the public the idea that the White House is approaching talks with Moscow in a constructive spirit, and if there is no progress, it will not be the administration's fault.

They are trying to exert pressure on the U.S. House of Representatives, which is demonstrating its opposition by adopting several resolutions and amendments that are in contrast to the White House course of the arms race. Representatives of the administration, an ABC television correspondent indicates, create the impression that the 2-day consultations in Moscow went well. The sides are apparently ready to achieve progress at talks on elaborating a new agreement in the arms control sphere, but the House of Representatives decisions are supposedly undermining these prospects.

So it turns out that the U.S. Administration is turning the Soviet-American consultations which are, by their very nature, confidential, into a means of political maneuvering.

It is clear that this can only do harm to the businesslike exchange of opinions, and considerable harm at that. And the official American position on such a key problem of disarmament as a nuclear test ban is as yet hardly inspiring, to put it mildly.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW COMMENTS ON SUMMIT, REAGAN NST PROPOSAL

LD151358 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 15 Aug 86

[Text] Is there going to be a Soviet-American summit? Are there real hopes for disarmament? Many listeners ask these questions. Radio Moscow's Yury Solton replies:

The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the United States President Ronald Reagan agreed to meet again when they negotiated at Geneva last November.

They had then they agreed their next meeting should help improve Soviet-American relations, which would affect the international situation in a most favorable way, and that'd more contribute significantly to the work to bring about disarmament. The Soviet Union has never slammed the door or yielded to provocations, even when tension was especially sharp, let's say when the United States carried out an air raid on Libya or when it provocatively sent warships to the Black Sea, or even when the Department of State adopted an arbitrary decision to reduce the personnel of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Moscow has remained in favor of another summit, if of course the meeting helps bring the leaders of the two nations closer together. The summit will prove fitting and proper if it leads to tangible moves towards disarmament.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have exchanged letters that express their views on this score. Although the letters have not been published, the press reports that have sprung out prompt definite conclusions. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness for a notable compromise, bearing in mind that the main objective is to prevent weapons in space and dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals. As for the American President, his letter ignores the main condition, that of equality and equal security. The United States reserves the right to deploy space weapons in 7 years, when it is ready to do so and not before, and it expects to get rid of strategic missiles alone, keeping intact heavy bombers and missile-carrying submarines where it holds an edge.

The ball is now in the Russian court, says the United States President, but disarmament is not a soccer field to hope to score indefinitely. [as heard] It's wrong to take the Soviet readiness for compromises for its weakness. Any objective person can see in the Soviet proposals responsibility for the destinies of the world. A responsibility of this kind is yet to manifest itself in Washington, where officials try to reinforce their security at the expense of others. It does not depend on the Soviet Union if our hopes for disarmament come true; it depends entirely on the United States.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW CRITIQUES REAGAN NST LETTER

LD131831 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 17 Aug 86

[From the "Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow")

[Excerpts] [Pozner] Today's subject I think is obvious because it's one that is being discussed in many capitals all over the world and that is the situation, if you wish, in the area of arms limitation and reduction pertaining to the letter, the July letter of President Reagan that was an answer to a letter addressed to him by General Secretary Gorbachev.

Now this letter, as we know -- I am now talking about President Reagan's letter -- has not been published.

However, there has been a series of leaks in Washington, which seems to be an incredibly leak-prone city, and those leaks tend to be very optimistic, basically, as to what President Reagan has written in that letter and there has been a lot of noise and I would even say a jubilation mood almost, say, that now the ball is back in the Soviet Union's court and that if the Soviet Union makes a constructive attempt to capitalize on the offers made in this letter then we will see real progress and a very good summit at the end of the year. That's basically the message. Let's look at all of that and let us also remind our listeners, because I fear they may not be too well aware of the concrete proposals that were made in the letter addressed to President Reagan by General Secretary Gorbachev in June. Now, who'd like to start the ball rolling today?

[Bogdanov] Well, it did [words indistinct]...

[Pozner] Professor Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] It makes no difference maybe just to keep the tradition, [words indistinct]...

[Pozner] You're the one who usually starts. Right, okay.

[Bogdanov] Because Sergey likes to think it over and before he starts he gathers all his thoughts.

[Pozner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] But, you know, I would before we talk about that, let me put some questions to our overseas listeners. Number one question is, why, why such a confidential letter, as it was said in Washington, was immediately leaked after several hours it was sent. It was leaked so fast to such an extent that it was absolutely clear to everybody what is in there. Now, let me call your attention to another point. I (felt it) very serious event, you know, for so many months, for the first time an American delegation, a very important arms control delegation -- I am not sure it's arms control delegation or not [laughs], in any case...

[Pozner, interrupting] It's supposed to be that.

[Bogdanov] It's supposed to be that -- comes to Moscow to discuss very important matter related to Geneva conference and maybe to summit, to summit meeting. And they bring with them the famous proposals to discuss with us. Now, my question to you, Sergey, and to you, Vladimir, is why such a big American delegation? It's unusually big, it's huge American delegation, and my question is how you can seriously discuss within 2 days in such a big company?

[Pozner] Let me jump in here. You ask two important questions which I think should be answered. Incidentally, the other day I was interviewed on the Good Morning, America show and -- I was here in Moscow -- and they had a guest in the studio over there, Senator Sam Nunn, certainly a well-known senator.

[Bagdanov] Yes, Yes, (?sure).

[Pozner] And he made a point about this delegation. He said when you send a delegation consisting of seven people you're not going to get results. He made that point, so I think that maybe he answered your question. Maybe that...

[Bagdanov, interrupting] Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.

[Pozner] Maybe Senator Nunn said, in fact he did say, that the delegation was sent so as not to get any results and that could be one answer. Dr Plekhanov, how do you feel about that and also the other question that Dr Bogdanov asked and that is why this leak that turned into a shower [word indistinct] or into a jacuzzi? [all laugh]

[Plekanov] That's right. Well, I happen to like number seven and I don't think it's just a matter of numbers. It's the fact that the delegation didn't seem to have brought anything worth discussing. And that's the problem and the same problem pertains to President Reagan's response to Mikhail Gorbachev's letter. Because our letter contained a number of proposals which were consistent on our part. [passage omitted]

[Pozner] Let's get back to what President Reagan seems to be offering, judging from what we read.

[Bogdanov] Ya, but let me emphasize that the focal point of all that is the [word indistinct] defense. And our proposal that the ABM (?regime) should go on for 15 years that is the key to this whole business of arms control in the nearest future. Now, what we've got in response?

[Pozner] What have we got?

[Bogdanov] We've got in response, if you judge by the leakage, and that's the only source we (?do), we got in response Americans' proposal not for 15 years but 7 years, 5

or 7 between 5 and 7 years, to be ABM Treaty to be in force [as heard]. Then we take a decision that we allow ABM system to be -- that the star wars system to be deployed mutually or separately and that takes another 2 years.

[Pozner] [word indistinct] I think what you are saying is 5 years we don't, nobody deploys.

[Bogdanov] No, nobody.

[Pozner] And then 2 years after that we discuss deployment.

[Bogdanov] We discuss deployment...

[Pozner, interrupting] That makes 7 years.

[Bogdanov] ... even if the Soviet Union does not agree to deploy then America takes unilateral decision and deploys or simultaneously they deploy.

[Plekhanov] Let me interrupt you for a moment.

[Bogdanov] Yes, sure.

[Plekhanov] In the reply by President Reagan the 5-year period covers not just research but also testing, development, everything...

[Pozner] [words indistinct]

[Plekhanov] ...everything up to deployment, so that reflects so-called new interpretation of the ABM Treaty which was rejected by most knowledgeable observers in the discussion that took place several months ago.

[Pozner] Okay.

[Bogdanov] And if you, if you just come back to our worries about the whole business in the arms control and the whole business with the star wars you will see that it's not a fair deal. It's a kind of, you know, it's a kind of proposal not how to stop to deploy but how to deploy in the best possible way which is absolutely -- it's a mockery, I am sorry to say.

[Pozner] Now wait a minute. What does the President propose in exchange for that? He says a 7-year period before deployment, we offer you that, what else does he desire? Is there anything else that we know about in that letter? Are there cuts in strategic weapons in exchange for this readiness to...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] You know, he... yes, yes, yes, he desires, he desires some cuts, very substantial.

[Pozner] Fifty percent, I believe.

[Bogdanov] Yes, 50 percent cuts, but, there is one but, if you do deploy no cuts are possible [chuckle], it's just like that [as heard]. You can cut it and you make it absolutely clear to American side that cuts are impossible, are possible, only provided you forego the star wars business. Then you have a statement that whatever it is we will deploy within 5, 7 years time, but at the same time you cut. So where is the logic? So there is no deal in that, you know, it's a kind rather, I'm sorry to say it's a kind of dictate, you know.

[Pozner] Would you like to add anything to that? What about the fact, excuse me, what about the fact that when we are offered this, this proposal that the United States will not deploy for 7 years, but could they deploy if they tried in 7 years? So what kind of an offer is it?

[Plekhanov] Well, that's a strange kind of an offer. I think it's done just for cosmetic reasons in order to put a good face on something that is not too good, and to deflect criticism from the Reagan administration's proposals to do away with the ABM Treaty. In fact this is a proposal for a joint action against the ABM Treaty. If the United States tried to do it unilaterally and the Soviet Union continues to adhere to the ABM Treaty that looks bad because that means that one of the parties just throws away a valuable document. Now to me, this is my personal opinion, but this counter offer which President Reagan made looks like an invitation to the Soviet Union to jointly kill the ABM Treaty, which would be I think a very silly thing of us to do.

[Pozner] I don't want to get too technical, but I do think that we should keep in mind also that the American-proposed cuts, the 50 percent cuts, which come as, if you wish, a concession if we agree to the 7-year proposal, those cuts concern only inter-continental ballistic missiles, that is land-based and sea-based, they do not concern heavy bombers, which I think is a very important fact.

[Bogdanov] Ya, it's very important by itself, because Americans stay strong where they were always stronger than we are, that they try to conserve that, you know. But let me, let me go a little bit away from the technicalities and to put a general question to you, Vladimir, and to you, Sergey. What is the political meaning of all that? You know, as a political animal, I am very interested in technical details, but I am more interested what does it mean politically.

[Pozner] We have about 2 minutes left and I'd like you to try to give the answer. As a political animal what would you say?

[Bogdanov] Ya, you know, that is yes, what they would say.

My impression is that it has to do a lot with the domestic situation back home in USA. If you keep in mind the mid-term election that this presidency does not so far produce a (?bid) in the arms control field, if there is an impression that American allies are just revolting against, you know, American policy, you may have an impression that they sent this team just to pacify. They make this hue and try to create an impression that everything is okay, everything is excellent with the Soviet Union. Why you should worry, and the President, the great President brings you back peace with the Soviet Union, then that may impact on the mid-term elections. Some people somewhat may think over twice before what form this or that has. So, as a political animal, I am absolutely sure that first of all they meant their domestic business, domestic business.

Now let me just read three lines, just [word indistinct] quote three lines of the famous fellow who is sitting in the White House, very responsible one, whose name is very well known to the Americans, he is Patrick Buchanan, Patrick Buchanan, and now I leave it to the Americans to judge how we Russians at this side should take all that business. He says, and I quote, American delegation came out to forego SDI, they went to Moscow to assure its future. Now, point of order, there are only several questions. Who will create strategic defense, where it will be deployed and who will deploy this system. USA or USSR will do it sooner? USA or USSR together? As it's suggested by the President, nothing else be discussed in Moscow. I quote and I leave it to you, to our listeners, how we should take all that (?as the facts).

[Pozner] When we wind up there is one question that has not been answered, and it was asked at the beginning, I still leave it to you Dr Plekhanov to answer it. Why the big leak? What do you think was really the reason to let this cat out of the bag?

[Plckhanov] Well, because the time is coming near when the question of a summit meeting will be put on the agenda, and there will have to be decisions made and since Geneva we haven't had really any substantial progress in terms of the directions laid out in Geneva almost a year ago, and the Reagan administration is, I think rightfully, concerned that the public opinion both in the United States and in the world at large will hold it responsible. Because the Soviet Union in that year which has passed has done and proposed so much, has refrained from testing nuclear weapons, has but forward a program of nuclear disarmament, has been very, very flexible in addressing the concerns that the American side has expressed on every point of the disarmament agenda, from SDI down to medium-range missiles. And in response what we get from the American side is statements like the one quoted by Dr Bogdanov, Mr Buchanan saying well actually, you know, this is not serious we are not going to give away anything.

[Pozner] Well thank you. In conclusion, I'd like to remind our listeners of the following. If you watched Good Morning, America the other day when I was on with Senator Sam Nunn the moderator David Hartman quoted President Reagan as having said that there were domestic pressures in the Soviet Union forcing the General Secretary Gorbachev to go for a summit. I corrected those words, saying that we have traditionally, the Soviet leadership has always desired to have normal relations with the United States, and has always tried to have high level, including top level, negotiations provided they brought some results.

What I think we've touched on today are the domestic pressures in the United States that are pushing the present administration into a position where it has to at least put up a smokescreen of activity, while not making any real offers it at least has to make public opinion believe that such offers are being made.

That is how I personally assess the leaks that we have been talking about, the noise, the jubilation that we've been hearing and all the pseudo activity that is in reality no activity at all.

Thank you all for listening, we'll be back a week from today at the same time, and always remember we appreciate your suggestions and your views, so let us hear from you. Until next time, on behalf of Top Priority, this is Vladimir Pozner wishing you all good listening.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET REPORTS ON U.S. CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY BUDGET DEBATES

Senate Rejects SDI Cut

LD060700 Moscow TASS in English 0633 GMT 6 Aug 86

[Text] Washington, 6 Aug (TASS)--The U.S. Senate rejected by 50 votes against 49 an amendment to the bill on military appropriations for the fiscal year 1987, calling for a considerable cut in expenditures for the Reagan "Star Wars" programme, requested by the White House. The amendment tabled by Democratic Senator Bennett Johnson provided for a decrease in budget allocations for the implementation of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" from 5.3 billion dollars required by the administration to 3.2 billion dollars. A similar amendment is under consideration by the House of Representatives.

A one vote majority won by advocates of space militarization plans testifies to a serious opposition in the U.S. Congress to the "Star Wars" programme described by Democratic Senator John Kerry as "cancerous tumour." It is indicative that the Senate Committee on Armed Services had proposed earlier that the administration's request for the SDI be cut to 3.9 billion dollars in the next fiscal year. According to some estimates, the total cost of this militarist programme can amount to 1,000 billion dollars. News agencies report that President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger have started intensive conditioning of legislators in an attempt to cajole them into backing the administration's requests.

Senate Rejects ABM Test Ban

LD091016 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 9 Aug 86

[Text] Washington, 9 Aug (TASS)--The U.S. Senate has supported the Reagan Administration's plans of spreading the arms race into outer space. By 55 votes against 43 the senators have voted down an amendment to the bill on appropriations to the Pentagon providing for an extension to the 1987 fiscal year of the annual ban on anti-ballistic missile weapons testing expiring next month. The ban was introduced on the initiative of the House of Representatives. The lower chamber of the U.S. Congress adopted it last year, but the Senate declared against it. But in drawing up a compromise version of the bill on military appropriations, the House-Senate Conference Committee left the ban in

force. This year the U.S. House has not yet examined the question of anti-ballistic missile weapons testing. Senator John Kerry condemned the decision of his colleagues and warned that the creation of satellite killer weapons could lead only to weapons race in outer space.

House Votes SDI Fund

PH141243 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Billions for 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Aug -- The U.S. Congress House of Representatives has adopted an amendment to the draft law on military appropriations, providing for the allocation of \$3.1 billion to the implementation of the "star wars" program in fiscal 1987.

The discussion of this question demonstrated the concern felt by many lawmakers about the White House plans to extend the arms race to outer space. Thus a whole series of congressmen characterized the "star wars" program as "madness." Congressman Ronald Dellums, in particular, stated that it "will lead to a new, highly dangerous spiral in the arms race and bring the world closer to nuclear disaster." He stressed that the implementation of the space militarization plans will mean the violation of agreements in the arms limitation sphere.

"The implementation of the 'star wars' program," Congressman Robert Mrazek stressed in his speech, "will be the start of a new stage in the nuclear arms race."

The Reagan administration originally asked Congress for \$5.2 billion for further work under the "star wars" program. As observers note, the White House was well aware from the first that the lawmakers would not approve that sum in conditions where there is growing concern in the country over the possible consequences of the militarization of space. So the idea was to obtain a considerable sum for the program's implementation even given a reduction on the sum requested.

'Drastic Reduction' in Allocation

LD130627 Moscow TASS in English 0620 GMT 13 Aug 86

[Text] Washington, 13 Aug (TASS)--The House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress has adopted with 239 votes for and 176 against the amendment to the draft law on military allocations providing for a dramatic reduction of resources allocated for the implementation of Reagan's "Star Wars" program.

In accordance with it, it is planned to channel to the U.S. Defense Department in fiscal 1987 3.1 billion dollars for the needs of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. The White House requested the Congress to allocate 5.2 billion dollars for the "Star Wars" program in fiscal 1987.

House Backs SALT II

PM141029 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Sensible Step; House of Representatives Challenges Reagan Administration"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Aug -- Challenging the Reagan administration, which has refused to observe the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty, the House of Representatives voted by 225 to 186 in favor of the amendment of Congressman Norman Dicks aimed at blocking this White House decision. The amendment prohibits the allocation of fund for the deployment of nuclear arms over and above the limits stipulated by SALT II.

As the legislators stated during the debate, the U.S. refusal to observe the SALT II Treaty will complicate the international situation, lead to a deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations, and hamper the achievement of new arms control agreements. "The White House's decisions runs totally counter to our national security interests," Congressman Les Aspin stated, for instance.

By adopting the Dicks amendment, the House of Representatives has taken a more resolute step than in June, when it approved a resolution that was not binding on the administration urging the President to observe the treaty. Congress' new action reflects the intensifying demands in the country that SALT II should not be abandoned but, on the contrary, that progress should be made along the road of reaching new arms control agreements and striving not to step up but to weaken and eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

However, the Senate, where Reagan's Republican Party holds the majority, refused to pass the amendment and it will most likely be buried in the Conference Committee.

An agreement serving both sides' interests was how Lee Hamilton, member of the House of Representatives, described the SALT II Treaty in an article published in ARMS CONTROL TODAY, the bulletin of the Arms Control Association.

He stresses that all the conclusions cited by the administration to justify the decision taken on the alleged treaty "violations" by the Soviet Union are extremely dubious and certain facts have been wrongly interpreted. "There is no proof," L. Hamilton notes, "that the USSR has ever violated SALT II or any other treaty." The congressman cites a number of reasons which in his opinion prove the need to fulfill the provisions of the agreement. The treaty sets limitations on both sides' activity, the writer notes, and serves as a basis for further talks and progress in the arms control sphere. But a rejection of this document will lead to increased stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons and, consequently, to a destabilization of the international situation. Damage would be done not only to the arms control process but to Soviet-U.S. relations as a whole, he points out.

House-Senate Differences

OW161249 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 15 Aug 86

[Boris Parkhomenko commentary; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Discussion on the U.S. military budget for the 1987 fiscal year is continuing in the U.S. Congress. Our commentary:

[Parkhomenko] Hello comrades. Voting on the budget has already taken place in both houses of the Congress. The upper house, the Senate, approved the amount of \$295 billion.

The lower house, the House of Representatives agreed to allocate a little less, \$292 billion, for the Pentagon.

The difference of three billion arose in connection with the House of Representatives' decision to freeze funds intended for the development of an ABM system that includes space-based elements. May I remind you that this system is a substantial and integral part of the so-called SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative of the United States.

Based on the doctrine that envisages the possibility of surviving and even winning in a large-scale nuclear conflict, the White House intends to create, as they say there, a space shield. This erroneous and essentially dangerous doctrine leads to even more dangerous and real consequences, the direct militarization of space, a new and deadly turn in the arms race.

The militarists' passion for the "star wars" game is far from popular with everybody in the United States.

During the debate on the military budget draft bill, Congressmen introduced over 90 amendments and this had led to a reduction of \$25 billion in allocations for military spending compared with what was requested by the Defense Department. Now there is a new discrepancy in the Pentagon's future budget -- a reduction by another \$3 billion.

Now a congressional conference committee will have to work out a compromise version of the draft bill. Whatever the outcome, the struggle for military funding reflects the growing dissatisfaction of the American public with the United States increasing expenditures for sustaining a rapid pace in the arms race.

SALT Issue Plays Role

LD160153 Moscow TASS in English 0117 GMT 16 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 16 TASS -- The U.S. House of Representatives has adopted its own version of the 1987 draft military budget, allocating the Pentagon 286 billion dollars instead of 320 billion as requested by the White House.

The draft military bill, approved by the legislators, reflected wide displeasure felt by representatives of the Democratic Party in Congress over the Reagan administration's refusal to abide by provisions of the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty.

An amendment to the draft law, adopted earlier, banned the allocation of funds for the deployment of nuclear armaments above the limits set by SALT-2.

Many congressmen emphasized during the debates that SALT-2 provisions met the interests of the U.S., while the administration's refusal to comply with them would complicate the international situation and block new major arms control accords.

Reagan 'Attacks' House Version

LD162107 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 16 Aug 86

[Text] Washington, 16 Aug (TASS) -- In his regular Saturday radio address to the nation, U.S. President Ronald Reagan has showered fierce attacks upon the House of

Representatives, which approved a number of amendments to the bill on military allocations for 1987 that are opposed by the administration.

He has threatened to impose a veto on the bill, which includes a ban on testing antisatellite weapons, a halt to nuclear explosions above one kiloton, a refusal to allocate resources for the production of binary chemical weapons, and a freeze at this year's level on spending on Reagan's darling -- the "star wars" program. The President's displeasure has also been invoked by the congressmen's decision not to allocate resources for the production of strategic weapons, if it would lead to a violation of the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II treaty. "I will veto the bill, if it contains this kind of provisions," Reagan stated.

Recesses Following 'Stormy Debates'

LJ160642 Moscow TASS in English 0603 GMT 16 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 16 TASS -- The U.S. Congress will now have its scheduled recess after a month of stormy debate on items on the agenda of the latest session of the supreme legislative authority of that country.

The most important of those questions was the military budget of the USA for the 1987 fiscal year beginning on October 1. The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed different bills on appropriations to the Pentagon. Both chambers have cut the 320 billion-request of the Reagan administration for appropriations, but the Senate decided to set aside for the Pentagon 295 billion and the House of Representatives -- 286 billion. It also voted that the U.S. Administration should adhere by the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty abandoned by the White House, and for a ban on nuclear blasts with a yield of more than one kiloton. The Senate confined itself to calls for the observance of SALT-2 and for talks with the USSR on a ban on nuclear testing.

Unlike the Senate, the House included into the bill a ban on anti-satellite weapons testing, and declined appropriations on the production of chemical weapons. It has also cut by far more drastically than Senate the sum requested by the administration of Reagan's "star war" programme.

On the last day of its session, the Senate voted for the imposition of sanctions on the Republic of South Africa, which are, however, of a half-and-half character and are in the nature of a face-lifting exercise. The House of Representatives earlier declared for practically total ban of U.S. trade with the RSA. Yet, the White House is unhappy even about the type of sanctions proposed by the senators.

There were no differences between the two chambers on the question of the USA against Nicaragua. Both have decided to appropriate 100 million dollars on military aid to the contras, whom the White House wishes to use in order to try to overthrow Nicaragua's legitimate government.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRANCE'S LE FIGARO SEES POSSIBILITY OF U.S.-SOVIET THAW

PM011107 Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Jul 86 p 1

[Editorial by Jean Francois-Poncet: "Thaw?"]

[Text] For almost 7 years now East-West relations have been in deadlock and dialogue. Although without ever being completely broken off, relations between Washington and Moscow have been strained.

Coming after many signs of a thaw over recent weeks, Mr Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok and the fact that another U.S.-USSR summit will almost certainly be held before the end of the year give us grounds for wondering whether things are now different.

Of course the superpowers' attitudes are always partly propaganda, and the announcement of a reduction in Soviet troops deployed in Afghanistan and Mongolia is probably no exception to this rule. But the fact is that on one of the main aspects of their strategic dispute the positions adopted by the USSR and the United States are no longer irreconcilable.

It has been apparent for a long time that, in the offensive weapons sphere, Moscow and Washington are prepared to envisage a considerable reduction in their respective arsenals, which really are excessive.

The opposition in principle to "star wars" remains but, even if it is not overcome, there is a feeling that there could be a way round it. Mr Gorbachev no longer objects to the continuation of research in this sphere, provided that confirmation of the ABM Treaty for a long period gives him the guarantee that this research will not produce operational results for a long time. However, the Challenger accident, the failure of the replacement launchers, and the reduction in funds imposed by Congress have the effect of delaying SDI in any case and hence of delaying the transition from the research to the development phase.

There remains the matter of intermediate weapons, which the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles has not sufficed to

settle. But on this point too things are moving on both sides, now that the zero option has been abandoned. As for the freeze on the British and French forces set by Moscow as a condition, it is no longer being demanded with as much rigidity if it is true, as Mr Shevardnadze implied in London, that he would not obstruct the current modernization of these two forces.

It would of course be rash to conclude from the foregoing that on all or even any of these points agreement is in sight and will be easy to reach. That would mean forgetting that it is often the details that cause the problems and that there are still too many sites of conflict in the world for all misgivings to be eliminated.

The fact remains that a thaw in American-Soviet relations must by now be considered a possibility and that if it does begin to materialize its chances of spreading will be all the greater inasmuch as it will follow a long writer. We would then be faced with a new political situation which the Europeans would do well not to ignore for too long.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRANCE'S LE MONDE VIEWS GORBACHEV 'GESTURES' IN VLADIVOSTOK

PM040702 Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Jul 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Gorbachev and the Pacific"]

[Text] The peace offensive on all fronts launched by Mr Gorbachev a little over 1 year ago was continued in the Asian sphere with the speech which the Soviet leader delivered in Vladivostok on Monday, 28 July. Turning his attention toward this Asia-Pacific region, which is the USSR's great window on the sea but also one of the main areas of development in the world, the Kremlin leader had something relatively pleasant to say about each country in the region, including the two other great powers — the United States and China. But the promises he made to the various countries do not have equal value.

As far as the United States is concerned, the main thing to note is the cautious tone with which Mr Gorbachev commented on Mr Reagan's recent reply to his disarmament proposals. The details of this reply are not known but it is clear that, for the first time in 3 years, it marks a resumption of dialogue on the root of the questions which divide the two superpowers: The latter are moving toward a summit of "substance" rather than one concerned with atmosphere toward the end of this year, and nothing is being done on either side to jeopardize this prospect.

With regard to this issue, the minor gesture made by Mr Gorbachev on Afghanistan is in fact relatively unimportant. Neither the USSR nor the United States is making this problem a precondition for the normalization of their relations. However, the withdrawal of several thousand men may help improve the atmosphere because at the very least it shows, in principle, a refusal to escalate by increasing the Soviet contingent and stepping up the level of military operations in that country.

The gestures made toward China are more important because they are intended to satisfy one of the conditions laid down by Beijing for the normalization of its political relations with Moscow: the reduction of the Soviet troops on the border between the two countries. Since the great quarrel in the 1960's, the USSR had massed more than 1 million men in the Far East, including a large contingent in Mongolia, formerly known as "Outer Mongolia" — a Soviet buffer state since the 1920's and brought into Moscow's camp after the first signs of the quarrel between the two communist capitals. Mr Gorbachev has now

announced that this contingent could be "greatly" reduced and at the same time a reciprocal reduction in ground forces in the region could be negotiated with China.

The problem is that Beijing's other two demands are not being given such an understanding treatment although they are even more important to China. Beijing is not likely to find the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan any more attractive than the other capitals — still less what Mr Gorbachev is capable of offering on Cambodia, in other words nothing at all. Indeed, as far as the Soviet leader is concerned, this latter problem must be solved by Phnom Penh and its daunting Vietnamese neighbor, and even the United Nations has no right to interfere....

Nonetheless China should "pocket" the Soviet gesture on Mongolia and see it as another incentive to continue a rapprochement with the USSR which has already taken on the appearance of a normalization in the economic, technical, and cultural spheres.

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CSO: 5200/2736

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON 131ST U.S. B-52'S WITH ALCM'S

TASS Report

LD191051 Moscow TASS in English 1031 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT on 19 August carries a service message "killing" this item]

[Text] Washington August 19 TASS - The Reagan administration has officially announced a first step taken by the United States in violation of the Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty. Meeting with reporters Monday, Gen. Larry Welch, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, said that the Air Force had begun to modify its B-52 bombers to carry cruise missiles.

When the first B-52 bomber is equipped with cruise missiles, the United States will exceed the ceiling set by the treaty on delivery systems for multiple-warhead munitions. Welch said the modification work on the first of the 131 U.S. B-52 bombers would be completed within three months.

TASS Substitution

LD191455 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 19 TASS -- The Reagan administration has officially announced a first concrete step taken by the United States in violation of the Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty. Gen. Larry Welch, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, said that the Air Force had begun to modify its 131st B-52 bomber to carry cruise missiles.

The first 130 B-52 bombers had earlier been modified the same way.

When the 131st B-52 bomber is equipped with cruise missiles, the United States will exceed the ceiling set by SALT-2 on delivery systems for multi-warhead munitions. Welch said the modification work on the 131st U.S. B-52 bomber would be completed within three months.

'Breach' of SALT II

LD220523 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 21 Aug 86

[Text] Washington has announced that the United States Air Force has launched a modernization of 131 B-52 strategic bombers to accommodate long-range cruise missiles. Commentary is by Viktor Ivanov and this is what he writes:

When they go into service, the modernized bombers will represent a breach of the Soviet-American SALT II treaty, which set a ceiling of 1,320 cruises for each side. Since the administration said in advance that the deployment of new cruises will not be coupled with the dismantlement of existing ones, when the modernization of B-52's is completed, this will represent a significant increment on an agreed limit. The move will be something more than an attempt to upset the rough parity of strategic armaments between the Soviet Union and the United States. As a political consequence, an entire system of international agreements, which still make it possible to control strategic arsenals, may be thrown into a disarray [as heard] with the result that the chances of a world conflict breaking out will be all the greater. Faced with growing criticism of its policy of undermining SALT II, the American Administration is looking for excuses to justify its actions. It claims, for instance, that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty. On careful examination, however, the claim turns out to be totally fictitious. One man who is aware of this is Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee of the United States Congress. After a detailed study of the issue, he pointed out that the charge was totally baseless.

Leading experts in various fields have been warning about the dire consequences for the United States itself should it abandon the SALT II treaty. In the view of arms control experts Gerard Smith, Paul Warnke and others, the administration is playing into the hands of advocates of a further spiral of the nuclear arms race. This point of view is shared by many American lawyers. An open letter to the President, signed by some 1300 lawyers, says SALT II serves as the basis of United States national security. Senator John Chafee has declared that if the United States abandons SALT before we have a better agreement to replace it, we will see an effective end of United States-Soviet arms control and in all likelihood a renewed arms race stretching far into the future. Washington's attack on the treaty is logically tied up with other military and political moves: continued nuclear testing, plans to put weapons in space and the like. The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, noted the motives in a statement he made on 18th August. He said: A rightist, militarist group in the United States representing a powerful military-industrial complex is simply obsessed with an arms race. They may have a triple stake: 1) to maintain a steady flow of profits from arms manufacture; 2) to ensure military superiority for the United States; and 3) to try to wear out the Soviet Union economically and weaken it politically. The ultimate purpose is to secure commanding positions in the world, realize long-held imperial ambitions and be able to continue plundering developing countries, said Mikhail Gorbachev.

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CSO: 5200/1530

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS LISTS 'DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS' OF SALT II ABROGATION

LD141335 Moscow TASS in English 1256 GMT 14 Aug 86

["Threats Instead of Sensible Approach -- Analysis" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Moscow August 14 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev

The U.S. House of Representatives has passed an amendment to a bill on the Pentagon's budget, which is meant to block a White House decision to abandon the SALT-2 treaty. The amendment bans the allocation of funding to deploy nuclear arms beyond limits set by the treaty.

Its enactment reflects mounting congressional concern about the government's policy of sapping the foundation under the process of limiting and reducing arms.

The administration reacted with threats to law-makers. White House Spokesman Larry Speakes declared for all to hear that any such decision would be seen as extremely grave and the President would consider applying a veto.

In order to avoid compliance with SALT constraints, he said, the President would be recommended vetoing even the entire bill on the military budget. The present United States Administration thus is reluctant to listen to its own Congress, its NATO allies and world opinion demanding continued abidance by the accords regulating U.S. and Soviet activities in the field of strategic weapons.

The SALT accords are of tremendous political and military significance. First, they have demonstrated visually that given good will there is a real possibility to solve many complex international problems at the negotiating table. Second, they are based on the principle of equality and equal security, which is a guarantee against a world thermonuclear catastrophe. Third, they have limited the arms buildups by both sides in terms of not only quantity but also quality.

The SALT accords can only be summed up objectively as a serious obstacle to the arms race.

This is, however, exactly what the current U.S. political-military leadership finds unacceptable. If previously it has been able somehow to squeeze the "strategic program" for the 1980's, which was unveiled by Ronald Reagan on October 2, 1981, into the treaty's limits, now these limits have become too tight for it. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the Pentagon now finds even its own "strategic program" too tight as well as would like to expand it in an irresistible striving to give itself unlimited elbowroom for maneuver in terms of quantity and quality of strategic arms and win military superiority for the United States.

It is high time Washington realized, however, that a decision to break out of the SALT agreements will have most negative and dangerous implications. First, the system of treaties, which has been holding back the nuclear arms race, will be demolished and conditions will arise for a runaway race of a scope which is now hard even to predict.

Second, U.S. ability to be a reliable partner in signing any treaties and agreements will be put in question.

Third, prospects for talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva will be jeopardized.

Fourth, world tension will grow many times, while developments in arms evolution will no longer be predictable and can get out of control.

Those pressing for a boundless expansion of U.S. strength should realize the following fundamental law of our time: By increasing a threat to others, they weaken rather than enhance U.S. security.

A White House decision to scrap the SALT accords, Congressman Les Aspin commented with good reason, would fully contradict U.S. national security interests.

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CSO: 5200/1530

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA CITES BOSTON GLOBE CRITICISM OF REAGAN

PM060748 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Criticism of Reagan's Stance"]

[Text] New York, 4 Aug---THE BOSTON GLOBE has criticized the Reagan administration's stance in the arms control sphere. It is now becoming increasingly clear, it writes, that it is the White House and not the Soviet Union that is insisting on the arms race. If the arms race continues to progress in the present direction and at its present speed the results will be very alarming. Expenditure on the arms race will increase sharply, additional difficulties will crop up in the sphere of verification of treaties and agreements, and space will be literally poisoned by various weapon systems.

The Soviet Union has recently displayed considerable flexibility, thus demonstrating a serious desire to slow down the arms race, the paper stresses. As for the Reagan administration, its hostility toward the arms control process has become perfectly obvious. At first the administration merely blocked the process by offering unacceptable terms for starting talks, then it refused to move forward, and it began last fall to openly attack the SALT II Treaty and the treaty on limiting ABM systems, and attack with bravado.

The Reagan administration, THE BOSTON GLOBE continues, has begun to make far-fetched charges against the USSR in connection with allegedly treaty violations, although even Western disarmament experts have admitted that these charges are groundless. Moreover, if the administration really was interested in arms control and was worried about observance of treaties it would above all try, as a responsible approach to the matter requires, to settle disputes in the standing consultative commission which was set up for the express purpose of tackling such problems. But instead of this the Reagan administration has said that it no longer intends to abide by the terms of the SALT II Treaty and interim agreement on SALT I. Moreover, it has stressed that it does not even intend to discuss its own claims against the USSR.

Reagan, the paper writes in conclusion, wants a second Soviet-American summit because he wants the international public to see him as a competent and responsible politician. But the main thing, and Americans must realize this, is that Reagan does not want to achieve anything at this meeting.

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CSO: 5200/1530

SALT/START ISSUES

CPSU INTERNATIONAL CHIEF STARODUBOV HITS U.S. SALT STAND

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 17 Jul 86 p 16

[Article by Heikki Korhonen and Aimo Ruusunen: "Reagan Wants To Abandon SALT Treaty Since Profits of Arms Dealers Are in Danger"]

[Text] "Ineffective" is President Ronald Reagan's catchword in condemning the SALT II Treaty to limit arms.

In reality the agreement would seriously endanger the profits of the arms manufacturers who are Reagan's supporters.

"The USA wants to abandon the treaty since it is an obstacle to armaments. And armaments are exactly what the United States now wants," emphasizes Viktor Starodubov. Starodubov, who is presently acting as section chief of the international section of the CPSU, has been, among other things, an officer of the Soviet General Staff and an expert at the Geneva talks.

President Reagan's actions must be examined in relation to his support groups. Reagan was brought to power by the military industrial complex. A government dependent on this military industrial complex is not at all inclined to reduce armaments, rather to the contrary.

The SALT II Treaty began to "disturb" the United States at that phase when it was permitted a certain quantity of MIRVs in the agreement.

The United States now wants to develop new weapons, but at the same it does not want to scrap previous missiles.

If the SALT Treaty were observed, the United States would have to dismantle 18 Poseidon-class submarines. The construction of yet another 12 Ohio-class submarines is being planned.

There are economic as well as political factors behind Reagan's policy.

"By means of economic sanctions and also by accelerating the arms race Reagan is striving to drive the socialist countries into an economic impasse and to deprive them of their reputation," says Starodubov.

"But the West will not succeed in this game. And is not the investment much too great in this kind of game?"

Arms Reduction Is Not Appealing

Starodubov does not completely agree with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's positive assessment that progress has been made in essential questions in the Vienna arms limitation talks.

"The socialist countries as well as NATO are, indeed, of the same opinion regarding the reduction of American and Soviet troops and the proposed amounts do not differ very much from each other."

"But the demands of the West with respect to information concerning troops do not in any respect relate to the amount of troop reductions."

NATO would possibly be inclined to reduce the number of troops based in Europe by approximately 5,000 men. In return, however, it also wants an exchange of information concerning other troop units.

According to Starodubov, on-site inspection or surveillance is possible if NATO will agree to the Warsaw Pact's proposal of eliminating 500,000 soldiers from Europe.

"Only the reduction of troops has been given serious consideration in Vienna. Arms reduction does not seem to suit NATO's policy."

Four Nuclear Weapons States

The Soviet Union also wants to negotiate limits on nuclear weapons with France and England. This is completely natural since three nuclear weapons states are members of NATO, there is only one in the Warsaw Pact.

"France and England have never declared that they would remain outside of a confrontation. To the contrary, both have stated that their missiles are NATO's weapons," points out Starodubov.

"According to our position, the condition of a balance is a balance between all of the Warsaw Pact and NATO."

It is most important to the Americans that they do not want to withdraw weapons and troops from Europe. Europe continues to be the USA's frontline.

The Soviet Union wants to view both sides as a whole, which includes the various member countries of the military alliances and their weapons.

Spark of Hope for Peace Movement

Starodubov wishes for the peace movement such a new spark which would better be able to raise new hope in the world.

According to him, we should also talk about whether new initiatives represent just propaganda.

"Often it is argued that the Soviets are merely talking propaganda. Well and good. If it is mere propaganda, this can easily be put to the test by agreeing to the proposals. Then one can see whether the talk was mere propaganda."

Starodubov hopes that the Western media would publish Soviet proposals without distorting them.

"Frequently, comments contrary to the truth are now attached to them."

Cooperation Increasing

In the last year the Soviet Union has attempted to improve the international situation and accelerate disarmament by practical actions as well as by several proposals.

The negative attitude of the United States toward arms limitations is only one aspect of the issue.

In a debate conducted on Soviet television at the end of June First Deputy Director Vadim Zagladin of the CPSU's International Section divided Soviet initiatives into two groups: those concerning disarmament and those promoting increased international cooperation.

Even though disarmament has not been advanced, other initiatives have somewhat improved international cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/2729

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS: FIRST MX'S ASSEMBLED--New York, 15 Aug (TASS)--Work has begun at the U.S. Air Force Base Francis Warren in Wyoming to assemble the first two stages of an MX intercontinental ballistic missile, a base spokesman told the ASSOCIATED PRESS today. The work is being done right in the silo. The United States plans to substitute MX missiles for Minuteman systems. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1123 GMT 15 Aug 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON U.S. NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN FAR EAST

PMI 190929 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 86 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences Major General R. Simonyan, Retired, under the rubric "Pentagon's Base Strategy": "Nests of Aggression in the Pacific Ocean Zone"]

[Text] U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage claims without embarrassment: "U.S. territory extends far beyond Hawaii and the Aleutians... The U.S. border now lies more than 5,000 miles west of San Francisco's Golden Gate." Guided by such blatant imperial pretensions, the United States is taking extensive measures to build up its Armed Forces in the Pacific and create a ramified system of military bases and strongholds stretching from Japan and South Korea to Australia. The consequences of the militarization of this region are extremely dangerous. Particularly if one takes into account that conflict situations persist there. It should not be forgotten that it was in Asia that U.S. imperialism has waged the two largest wars since 1945 -- in Korea and Indochina.

A militarized Washington-Tokyo-Seoul "triangle" is being set up under pressure from the U.S. Administration. Although two of the three states in the region with nuclear weapons -- the PRC and the USSR -- have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States has sited nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads in a crisis zone on the Korean peninsula, and nuclear delivery vehicles on Japanese territory.

In Japan around 50,000 U.S. officers and men are deployed at 120 bases and other military centers. The largest bases are the Yokosuka and Sasebo Naval Bases, the Misawa, Yokota, and Camp Zama Air Bases, and the Iwakuni Naval Air Base.

Headquarters of the U.S. 7th Fleet are in Yokosuka, and a carrier group whose aircraft are nuclear-capable is also based there. Judging by Japanese Foreign Ministry statements, Yokosuka will also be the home port for the second carrier group headed by the nuclear aircraft carrier Carl Vinson. Nuclear submarines call there regularly. U.S. military specialists stress that the importance of this naval base for the Pentagon lies "not in the fact that it is needed to defend the United States or Japan, but because it is very convenient for waging a war against the Soviet Union."

The headquarters of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan and the U.S. 5th Air Army deployed in Japan and South Korea are located at Yokota Air Base. It keeps in touch around-the-clock with ships and aircraft on combat patrol and bases on Japanese and South Korean territory.

Washington has managed to win Tokyo's assent to the siting of nuclear-capable F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa Air Base. And it is no secret that the main task for these

aircraft will be to conduct "offensive operations against Soviet bases in Maritime Kray and Sakhalin."

Ruling circles in Japan, which, incidentally, was the first victim of U.S. nuclear weapons, do not restrict themselves to allocating their territory for U.S. bases, but also voluntarily undertake the functions of sidekick to the transatlantic pretender to the role of "world gendarme." This is what the Tokyo newspaper ASAHI writes on the subject: "Defense of our own territory, defense of sea lanes in a 1,000-mile zone around the Japanese archipelago, joint strikes with the United States against targets on Soviet territory, and a blockade of international straits -- that is the evolution of the main provisions of Japanese military doctrine."

South Korean territory has also been turned into a springboard for aggression. There are 40 U.S. bases located there with more than 40,000 servicemen and over 1,000 nuclear munitions. The most important base is Seoul, where the headquarters of the U.S. 8th Army and the 1st Joint U.S.-South Korean Corps are located. U.S. Air Force units use the Osan, (Kuson), Kwangju, and (Tetu) Air Bases.

The Pentagon is nurturing plans to site neutron weapons, Pershing-2's, and ground-launched cruise missiles in South Korea. Ships of the 7th Fleet started to be fitted with sea-launched cruise missiles back in 1984. As a result, AKAHATA writes, the number of U.S. nuclear delivery vehicles in South Korea and Japan is expected to double.

Tension is also being maintained in Indochina, where Thai territory has been used for a number of years as a springboard for attacks against the PRK by the U.S.-backed and U.S.-armed Pol Pot gangs. Washington is trying to "demolish" U.S. air bases in Thailand, which U.S. aircraft relied on for bombing Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian cities and settlements during the "dirty war" against those countries. Even now the U Taphao base is used by U.S. aircraft during joint exercises with the Thai Armed Forces.

In the Philippines the United States uses two major bases -- the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Field Air Base. Some 11,000 U.S. servicemen and nuclear weapons are deployed there and at a number of other strongholds. Philippine progressive public organizations are warning that Washington is creating a deadly threat to the country's future, since it is turning it into a target in the event of a nuclear conflict.

U.S. military centers in the Philippines are given great importance in the plan to implement the neoglobalism strategy. "My soldiers who have trained here in the Philippines," an American officer boasted, "are ready to fight in any climatic conditions anywhere -- be it sand, mountains, or valleys."

The Pentagon is actively opening up Australian territory. Port Cockburn Sound, for instance, has been provided as a base for U.S. aircraft carriers and missile-carrying nuclear submarines, and the Darwin and Learmonth airfields have been provided as landing stages for strategic bombers en route from Guam to the Persian Gulf. Electronics stations located in Australia are called upon via satellite to back up missile launches either directly from U.S. territory or from U.S. submarines.

In the Pentagon's base system a role of considerable importance is also given to Micronesia (the Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands). Reporting the construction of new bases in the Marianas in addition to the major base complex on Guam, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "Henceforth bombers will be able to strike against the Asian mainland... and missile-carrying submarines and surface ships will have a larger forward base than at present. Furthermore, ground forces can be deployed in the Marianas to provide a more flexible response to anything happening in that region."

It is worth noting that it was from Micronesian territory that the U.S. aircraft that dropped the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki took off in 1945. Since 1946 the United States has used the Micronesian Islands to carry out nuclear weapon and ICBM tests. Recently U.S. newspapers have been writing about the planned testing on Kwajalein of "nuclear elements" under the "star wars" program. ABC TV reports that the Pentagon intends to flex its "military muscles to keep the Pacific under its control."

Speaking in Vladivostok recently, M.S. Gorbachev said: "It must be stated that the militarization of and the buildup of the military threat in this part of the world are starting to move at a dangerous speed. The Pacific is being turned into an arena of military-political confrontation.

"This is what is increasingly concerning the people who live there. It also concerns us from every viewpoint, including the viewpoint of the security considerations of the Asian part of our country."

Washington is striving to make both its base and bloc strategy truly global in nature. To that end it is attempting to extend the "zone of influence" of the imperialist NATO bloc that it heads to the entire world, including Asia and the Pacific. The substantial links between the U.S.-NATO infrastructures and U.S. strategic groups in various "theaters of war" should also be seen from this standpoint. For instance, gendarme forces from the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific and the Mediterranean are being knocked together in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia. The 3d Marine Division, which is part of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force -- intended for invading above all the countries of the Persian Gulf -- is based on Okinawa.

Thus, the United States is striving to turn the military bases -- both those which are being created and those which are being expanded -- encircling the USSR, its allies, and the liberated countries into a single strategic complex. This would give the Pentagon additional opportunities to maneuver its forces and those of its bloc partners, to transfer them from one deliberately provoked seat of tension to another, and to threaten other countries. As we can see, Washington's base and bloc strategy is becoming more and more important in the implementation of the aggressive neoglobalist policy which threatens peace and international security.

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CSO: 5200/1528

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

"BRIEFS"

U.S. CRUISE MISSILE TEST FAILS--New York, 5 Aug (TASS)--A scheduled test of a cruise missile in the United States ended in failure. A spokesman for the Pentagon said that the missile launched Saturday from the battleship "Iowa" stationed in the Gulf of Mexico had strayed off course and fell in a sparsely populated marshy area in south Alabama. According to the spokesman, the missile carried no warhead. The UPI news agency noted that the first in a series of cruise missile test launches in the area of the east coast also ended in failure last December. Four test launches were made so far. Although both unsuccessful tests could potentially cause human casualties, the spokesman for the Pentagon said that the test launches would continue. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 4 Aug 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1528

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS REPORTS USE OF U.S.-MADE CHEMICAL ARMS IN DRA

LD131305 Moscow TASS in English 1210 GMT 13 Aug 86

[Text] Kabul August 13 TASS--A self-defence unit has detained a group of persons in the vicinity of Chashte-Sharif village, Herat Province, earlier subjected to an attack with chemical shells by counter-revolutionaries. The persons were photographing the contaminated area and were taking samples of soil and water.

Boris Gan, a NOVOSTI press agency correspondent in Kabul, met in an interrogation room of Afghanistan's State Security Ministry with one of those detained.

Rahim Majid, 30, fled to Pakistan under the influence of hostile propaganda. He got into the Warsak camp near Peshawar.

In the camp, he said, "I was trained by American instructors to investigate localities contaminated with chemical weapons. On the whole, I crossed the border inside Afghanistan for such missions on about twenty occasions."

Asked how the contaminated regions were designated, the detainee answered, "before each raid, we were given the name of the place and its coordinates.

The area of a chemical attack was known in advance. It was our task to present the description of the consequences of the attack and deliver 'material evidence' on the 'use of chemical weapons by Soviet and Afghan troops' to Pakistan". [quotation marks as received]

What Majid said was not a lone instance, said an Afghan Army major, Ghulam Nabi. "We found American mines and grenades, filled with the CS toxin, for the first time in 1981. We have seized numerous munitions of this kind ever since."

Major Nabi displayed grenades bearing the mark "U.S. Army SSMP 7" captured during operations against counter-revolutionary gangs in Paktia and Herat Provinces.

Bandits no longer dared engage openly with the Afghan Army, Major Nabi observed. "They fire shells and mines filled with toxic substances at remote villages where there are neither Afghan nor Soviet troops. Farmers become victims of chemical weapons.

Malicious rumors are then spread about chemical war allegedly waged by the USSR against Afghan civilians. These hoaxes, and the weapons used by the bandits bear the same trademark 'made in USA'".

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: DRA REBELS CAUGHT WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PM181147 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 86 Second Edition p 5]

[TASS report: "Using Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Kabul, 15 Aug -- In the Chesht-e Sharif region of Herat Province a self-defense detachment has apprehended a group of dushman belonging to a terrorist organization. The counterrevolutionaries, BAKHTAR reports, citing the Republic's security organs, were caught red-handed attempting to use chemical weapons.

One of those arrested, a certain Rahim Majid admitted that he had spent a long time in the Warsak camp on Pakistani territory, where the dushman do their combat training. Special groups intended to use chemical weapons against the Afghan population have been trained there by U.S. instructors.

The special groups, Majid pointed out, take turns to wait for the results of the terrible effect of gases and other toxic substances on peaceful inhabitants and photograph what has happened, so as to claim subsequently that these were "atrocities" committed by Soviet soldiers and Afghan Army servicemen.

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CSO: 5200/1532

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRC JOURNAL COMMENTARY ON U.S.-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS RACE

HK211518 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese No 15, 1 Aug 86 pp 22, 23

[Article by Wei Kang and Wu Wei: "Another Disturbing Sign in the Arms Race"]

[Text] Just as the people of the world are greatly worried about the spiraling escalation of the U.S.-Soviet arms race another disturbing sign has emerged in the arms race: The spring meeting of the NATO defense ministers officially approved on 22 May a plan for enhancing the NATO chemical warfare capability and a plan for the United States to study a new type of chemical weapon.

At a press conference after the meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that the modernization of chemical weapons "is an indispensable part of our objective of strength" and that an important aspect of the modernization program is that "we shall have binary chemical weapons." This produced an immediate reaction in the Soviet Union. In a commentary on 24 May, PRAVDA scathingly said that after becoming the "nuclear hostages of the United States" by deploying American medium-range guided missiles, Western Europe "again fell into the chemical trap of the Pentagon" at the meeting. In a statement of 30 May, the Soviet Government resolutely denounced the NATO resolution and held that it "will bring about especially harmful consequences."

There is no reason for the strong Soviet reaction. As it is, the Soviet Union is enjoying a 10 to 1 superiority over the United States in the relative strength of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has a well-trained chemical warfare force numbering 100,000 and even this figure can be expanded by 100 percent in wartime. It possesses 300,000 tons of chemical preparations for actual combat. Moreover, there are over 50 factories that produce or can produce chemical weapons, as well as over 40 special warehouses. The Soviet Union has been studying and manufacturing chemical weapons without a letup. By comparison, the United States only has over 30,000 tons of chemical preparations. Moreover, most of the chemical weapons in storage, such as the gas shells and gas rockets, are outdated and some have been leaked gas. Consequently, it has hardly any weapons to use today. There is no doubt that the NATO resolution will upset the current balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union and play a role in helping the United States seize an all-round military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Chemical weapons rely on the toxicity of chemical preparations to inflict casualties on opponents. Their power is second only to that of nuclear weapons. They can exterminate or inflict casualties on people without a protective cover over a large area and destroy ecological environment over a large area. Moreover, their antipersonnel capability can last a fairly long time. As far back as World War I, chemical weapons were manufactured and used. When used by German forces for the first time in Belgium in March 1915, they instantly left 15,000 people incapacitated and another 5,000 people dead. The number of people killed or wounded by chemical weapons in World War I was estimated at 1.3 million, and the survivors also suffered from incurable sequelae.

In view of their tremendous harm, chemical weapons have been strongly opposed from the start in all parts of the world. In 1925, 110 countries signed the "Geneva Protocol" on banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. During World War II, however, the German, Italian, and Japanese fascists again used chemical weapons. After the war, some countries still manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons. The superpowers, in particular, possess the largest chemical weapon arsenals in the world. In some regional conflicts and partial wars, chemical weapons are still used from time to time in countries like Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

In the late 1960's, seeing that the United States had failed to extricate itself from the war of aggression against Vietnam while the Soviet Union had drastically expanded its strength and that the growth and decline of the relative strength of the two sides was unfavorable to the United States, then President Nixon deemed it necessary for the United States to have detente. In an effort to "create an atmosphere" for the first U.S.-Soviet summit on limiting strategic weapons to be held at the end of 1969, Nixon made a "high gesture" by announcing that the United States would stop producing chemical weapons and would not be the first to use them. In 1974, the United States signed the "Geneva Protocol" of 1925. However, since the late seventies, new changes have taken place in U.S.-Soviet rivalry for world hegemony.

Particularly since the Reagan administration took office, the United States has been rebuilding armaments in all fields in an attempt to seize an all-round military superiority over the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1982, Washington often entertained the idea of reproducing chemical weapons. At that time, however, the United States regarded the modernization of nuclear weapons as a priority and, therefore, the reproduction of chemical weapons was still at the stage of deliberation.

Things have changed over the past 5 years. In a recent article, "U.S. Defensive Strategy," U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger bluntly asserted: "Now the United States begins to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength and hopefully from a relatively more powerful position of strength." Given a nuclear stalemate, Reagan has stressed a "low-intensity war" and attached importance to the development of conventional military forces. Thus, the redevelopment of chemical weapons, which come under the category of non-nuclear weapons, has been placed on the agenda. In early 1985, the United States set up a chemical weapon issue committee. It is also eager to develop a new type of binary chemical weapons, the development of which has been suspended for 17 years. A weapon for mixing two kinds of chemical material into gas, the binary chemical weapon is fatal to the nervous system. Weinberger said that it is "much safer to produce, transport, deploy, and use" this weapon, which is a trump card in chemical warfare.

The United States attaches increasing importance to chemical warfare. It has even entertained the idea of enhancing the strategic importance of chemical weapons to that of nuclear weapons. The United States wanted to step up the deployment and production of chemical weapons in Western Europe in order to "defend Europe's security." The West European allies have serious misgivings and are therefore not enthusiastic about this. Some have expressed their objections in public; some have maintained a "deliberately evasive silence"; some have stressed the need to ban chemical weapons through global talks; and some have advocated the idea of "setting up a nonchemical weapons zone in Central Europe." In spite of this, the United States has quickened its pace in this field. In July this year, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the allocation of over U.S. \$100 million for the production of binary chemical weapons. Meanwhile, the United States also stepped up its efforts to persuade its Western allies. Its argument is that: Owing to its superiority in conventional weapons, the Soviet Union will very probably be able to force NATO to choose between acknowledging defeat and making a nuclear reaction in a bloodless war if only it launches a limited offensive with chemical weapons against NATO. Since NATO is unwilling to use nuclear weapons, the new binary nerve gas weapon will provide a new choice. It can be used both as a deterrent force and as a retaliatory measure. Under these circumstances, the NATO defense ministers meeting approved the resolution. The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Luxemburg, Iceland, and Greece expressed their reservations, while Italy expressed its qualified support.

The United States and the Soviet Union have held numerous talks on the chemical weapons issue but no agreement has been reached so far. When they met in Geneva last November, the U.S. and Soviet leaders agreed to hold talks on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. However, after the representatives of the two countries held talks in Bern, Switzerland, last March, American officials only said that in preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons the two parties' "keynotes were positive." World public opinion has strongly condemned the study, production, and use of biological and chemical weapons. In 1968, the issue of banning biological and chemical weapons was placed on the agenda of the Geneva 18-state disarmament talks committee. Later, the talks on biological weapons were separately held. On 28 September 1971, the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, and other countries jointly presented a draft pact on banning biological weapons which, after being recommended by the United Nations, was signed in April 1972 and came into effect in March 1975. Since 1978, the Special UN General Assembly on Disarmament was consistently regarded a ban on chemical weapons as one of the most priority topics for discussion. However, for a long time the talks on banning chemical weapons have made little headway, the greatest stumbling block being how to verify and supervise them. Moreover, the production of chemical weapons is so closely linked to that of civilian industries that it is hard to differentiate one from the other. This also accounts for the slow progress of the talks.

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CSO: 5200/4068

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CANADIAN EDITORIAL: MOSCOW'S MOVE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 1 Aug 86 p A8

[Editorial]

[Text]

U.S. President Ronald Reagan certified to Congress this week that the administration has met all legislative requirements and will proceed with the production of binary chemical weapons. This project, which has the blessing of NATO, is only prudent in the absence of Soviet agreement to abolish its large chemical arsenal.

Since U.S. production won't begin until late 1988 at the earliest, there is still plenty of time for Moscow to change its stand. Verification is the sticking point in the current U.S.-Soviet negotiations on eliminating this category of weapons. On-site, on-demand inspections are essential, yet the Kremlin is unwilling to permit them.

For its part, the U.S. has repeated its pledge renouncing the first use of all lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons and asserting that a global ban remains its foremost priority.

The two types of binary weapons — in artillery shells and in Big Eye aerial bombs — will be kept on U.S. territory in peacetime. Once the binaries enter the U.S. arsenal, the existing unitary ones will be destroyed so there will be no net increase in total numbers.

This is good news for Germany in particular. Old and potentially unstable U.S. chemical weapons now stored there will be removed. Continental Western Europe will be free of chemical weapons in peacetime, in stark contrast to Eastern Europe.

Chemical weapons are nasty things. But if we must have them, binary ones are the safest. They're composed of two chemicals kept separated in their casing until they explode on the battlefield. They're non-lethal until combined upon detonation.

NATO hopes that the Soviets will now be pressured to accept the 1984 draft U.S. treaty banning all chemical weapons. If they do, Washington has pledged not to go ahead with binary production.

Meanwhile, by adding a credible chemical dimension to the Western arsenal of deterrence, the likelihood of "conventional" war will be reduced, according to defence planners.

Mikhail Gorbachev has been promiscuously making peace proposals since coming to power — the latest this week in Vladivostok. Before the mood passes, he should be reminded of his agreement with Reagan at last November's summit to intensify their bilateral discussions on banning chemical weapons. Although two rounds of such talks have been held, they have yet to produce any results.

Reagan has made it clear where he stands on this issue. If Gorbachev wants to prove to the world that Soviet policy has really changed, he now has the chance to do so.

An agreement to ban chemical weapons is within reach if Gorbachev really wants one. The next move is up to him.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

HOUSE OPPOSES BINARY ARMS--Washington, 14 Aug (TASS)--Despite pressure from the White House, the House of Representatives has opposed the Reagan administration's plans to start the manufacture of binary weapons. It approved representative John Porter's amendment to the Defense Budget Bill which prohibits the use of funds allocated for binary weapons throughout fiscal 1987. The amendment was passed by a single vote, 210 against 209, which reflected the degree of pressure put by the administration on the House. The Senate had earlier approved the administration's plans to manufacture a new generation of this weapon of mass destruction. The final decision on the issue will be adopted by the conference committee of the U.S. Congress. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0805 GMT 14 Aug 86 LD] /9274

SOVIET-U.S. CONSULTATIONS--Geneva, 21 Aug--On 18 and 20 August Soviet-U.S. consultations were held here on questions of a universal and total chemical weapons ban. Negotiations with the aim of concluding an appropriate international convention are being conducted at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. V. L. Israelyan from the Soviet side and Donald Lowitz, head of the U.S. delegation, from the U.S. side took part in the consultations. During the exchange of views that took place the sides discussed questions of principle of the convention being prepared, and also the state of affairs at the bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations on banning chemical weapons. The consultations in Geneva are being held in the framework of preparing for the meeting between USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 86 First Edition p 4] /9274

CSO: 5200/1532

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA ON CD: SPACE ARMS, NUCLEAR ARMS CUTS, TEST BAN

PM181003 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[V. Kuznetsov report: "For Space Without Weapons"]

[Text] Geneva -- The problems of preventing an arms race in space and nuclear war, and also nuclear disarmament problems are the focus of attention at the Disarmament Conference sessions.

The importance and topicality of these subjects, V.I. Israelyan, head of the USSR delegation, stressed, is indubitable. Taking the arms race into space will inevitably lead to the disappearance of the very basis of strategic stability and the foundations for preserving peace. The USSR has offered an alternative to "star wars" -- "star peace," the development of space through the joint efforts of all states for peaceful purposes.

The USSR considers it foolish to dissipate and duplicate states' efforts in the development of space. The program of cooperation proposed by the Soviet Union is broken up into three stages and is aimed at laying firm material, political, legal, and organizational foundations for "star peace" by the year 2000.

The delegations from the socialist community countries, K. Tellalov, head of the Bulgarian delegation, said in his speech, have repeatedly pointed out that a specific contribution must be made to resolving these tasks. It is our aim, he stressed, to prevent an arms race in space. This aim differs radically from the idea of "regulating" this race, which is being put forward by some delegations at the conference.

The Bulgarian representative said that the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament has aroused broad international support and that it is essential to exploit the potential of the Disarmament Conference to speed up this process. The question of setting up a special subcommittee of the five nuclear states' representatives should be studied. This subcommittee could contribute to the process of multilaterally seeking solutions to nuclear disarmament problems.

A report by a group of seismological experts was submitted at the latest plenary session. The report stresses that the technical potential exists to detect nuclear explosions and that it is essential to expand cooperation in this sphere. Australian delegation head Richard Butler supported the idea of broadening cooperation regarding technical means of monitoring nuclear tests.

The Indian and Mexican delegates dwelt in detail in their speeches on the August meeting between the six heads of state and government in Mexico, pointing out that the decisions taken on the issues of ending nuclear weapon tests and the nuclear arms race must give a boost to stepping up the activity of the Disarmament Conference.

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CSO: 5200/1531

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET REPORTS ON OPENING OF CDE CONCLUDING SESSION

Final Session Opens

LD190540 Moscow TASS in English 0520 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Stockholm August 19 TASS -- The concluding session of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opens its work here today.

A good deal has been done during the previous work of this major political forum by the efforts of socialist countries, a number of other states, above all neutral and non-aligned ones, to give a positive impulse to the course of the talks with a view to working out mutually acceptable accords on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament on the European Continent. The participants in the conference succeeded in reaching a compromise on the issue of notifications regarding airforce exercises, the common ground is also visible in a number of other areas under debate at the conference. However, the United States and its closest allies do not display so far a businesslike approach to the solution of the problems still on the agenda.

Local observers draw attention to the immense importance of reaching a meaningful agreement in Stockholm which would create the necessary propitious conditions for the work of the Vienna meeting of the representatives of the states-participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and thus -- for the second stage of the Stockholm conference which could attend the issues of disarmament. The sole way towards success is the way of compromises and mutual concessions on the basis of equality and equal security, for which goodwill on the part of all participants in the conference is needed.

Limited On-Site Inspections

PM 201038 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

["Wide-Ranging Program" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures opened its final first-stage session in the Swedish capital today, focusing on the 18 August statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet delegation to the forum called the conferees' attention to a wide-ranging program for achieving disarmament and ensuring international security, suggested in that statement, and to the Soviet Union's decision to extend its moratorium on nuclear blasts until January 1, 1987.

Soviet delegation leader Oleg Grinevskiy said the Stockholm conference should also play a role of its own in bringing down the level of military confrontation in Europe.

The socialist countries constructively cooperating with the other participants in the talks had done much to solve unresolved problems at the conference. One could not but be concerned, however, that, with the time running out before the conference's end, solutions to many important issues, including the verification problem, had still not been found.

Taking the verification concept set forth in the Budapest statement by the Warsaw Treaty countries a step further, the socialist states were prepared to agree to on-site inspections over confidence-building measures on a limited scale, namely to one or two such inspections a year in the territory of each country.

The socialist countries' latest initiative in Stockholm is vivid evidence of their readiness to press for a successful outcome of the conference.

Grinevskiy Press Conference

LD192103 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1848 GMT 19 Aug 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Dmitriy Biryukov]

[Text] Hello, comrades! The final session of the first stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe opened in Stockholm today. Naturally, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 18 August was at the center of the attention of the participants in the conference.

Comrade Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, told press representatives with what the USSR representatives came to the conference.

[Grinevskiy] We have taken a number of steps in order to turn the conference on to a path of practical understanding. We have now made another such step in proposing the inspection, a limited quota of inspections, on site. But, of course, the matter is up to our partners. Let us see how our proposals are met.

Polish Proposal Makes 'Headway'

LD211433 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 21 Aug 86

[**"At the Stockholm Forum" -- TASS identifier]**

[Text] Stockholm August 21 TASS -- TASS correspondents Vladimir Bogachev and Nikolay Vukolov report: At a meeting of the working group dealing with problems of observation, the Polish delegation today advanced new considerations about the problem of inviting observers to military activities notified. It was proposed to agree upon the threshold of numerical forces involved, above which all the participating countries would be obliged to invite observers. Below that threshold, invitation could be voluntary, as this is envisaged by the final act of the Helsinki conference on security and cooperation in Europe. As is noted in the lobbies of the forum, posing the question in this way is in the mainstream of the demands of many participating countries and makes for a headway at the talks on working out this important confidence-building measure.

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CSO: 5200/1531

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

PRC DELEGATE ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

OW220646 Beijing XINHUA in English 0621 GMT 22 Aug 86

[Text] Geneva, August 21 (XINHUA) -- Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, head of China's delegation to the 40-nation Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), told the conference today it has made some progress but has so far fallen far short of expectations.

For years, Fan said, "people throughout the world have been ardently hoping that the CD could carry out substantive negotiations on a nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, and produce practical and effective results. It is therefore disappointing that year after year the CD has remained in a state of inertia."

The 1986 session opened in Geneva June 10.

On the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Fan pointed out in his address that existing international legal instruments are of some significance but all have limitations and are thus inadequate for preventing the arms race from moving into space. "It is therefore necessary to conclude new international legal instruments," he added.

On chemical weapons, the Chinese ambassador said "We should not overlook the fact that a large amount of work still needs to be done in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in view of the differences on" ways of verifying that countries are complying with a ban."

"We welcome the willingness expressed by the two states with the largest weapons and hope that they will substantiate their intention with action," he added.

Fan, turning to the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to reduce the nuclear threat to non-nuclear-weapon states, all nuclear weapon states should, pending nuclear disarmament, undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear free zones.

"China has declared on many occasions that it unconditionally assumes this obligation. We are also in favour of concluding an international convention on protecting non-nuclear-weapon states against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons," he said.

The Chinese ambassador also expressed his support for "the Mexican Statement" issued recently by the leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Greece, Sweden, India and Tanzania calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to halt arms race.

He said the end of the arms race and maintenance of world peace are the common aspiration and strong demand of the people throughout the world and of all peace-advocating countries. Settling differences and disputes through dialogue has become the trend in the contemporary world, a development welcomed by the international community.

Ambassador Fan said China sincerely hopes that at such an important juncture the disarmament conference will score real achievements, instead of simply going through the motions.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is expected to conclude on August 29.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

SOVIET-U.S. CDE CONSULTATIONS--Stockholm, 16 Aug--Soviet-American consultations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, under review at the Stockholm conference, were held in the Swedish capital on 14-15 August. The Soviet side was led by Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation to the conference, and the American side, by Robert Barry, head of the American delegation. The consultations were held within the framework of preparations for the meeting between Eduard Schevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, and George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. The exchange of views enabled the sides to consider in a frank [otkrovennyy] atmosphere the situation at the conference that enter to the final stage of its work. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4] /9274

CSO: 5200/1531

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON EXTENDING MORATORIUM

PM181551 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Aug 86 First Edition p 1

[**"Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee"**--
PRAVDA headline; capitalized passages published in boldface]

[Text] Good evening, Dear Comrades!

At my meeting with you today I would like to make a statement about one of the key problems of international politics.

A few days ago -- on 6 August -- the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, to which, as you know, the Soviet Union has adhered strictly for a year, expired.

What was the basis of this decision, what was it that dictated this decision, which was not easy, was extremely responsible and indeed, I would say, was hard for us to take?

In a nutshell, it was the realities of the nuclear-space age.

What do they consist of? How do we see them?

FIRST. Mountains of nuclear and all kinds of other weapons have been piled up, and yet the arms race is still not slackening its pace but accelerating; the danger has emerged of its transfer into space; and intensive militarization is in progress in the United States and throughout the NATO bloc. It is important to stress that the pace of development of military technology is so rapid that it is leaving people, states, and politicians less and less time to comprehend the real danger and is reducing the possibility for mankind to halt the slide toward the nuclear abyss. We cannot delay, otherwise such refined arms systems will emerge that it will be completely impossible to reach agreement on controlling [kontrol] them.

The situation is becoming increasingly intolerable. It is no longer enough to maintain existing treaties: Major practical steps are needed that can bar the way to militarism and turn the development of events in a better direction. The "balance of terror" is ceasing to be a deterrent factor. And not only because terror itself is a poor counselor that can prompt actions with unforeseeable consequences. That terror is a direct participant in the arms race: Intensifying mistrust and suspicion, it forms a vicious circle of growing tension. There are many examples of this.

It has become utterly clear to everyone now that the old notions about war as a means of achieving political aims have had their day. In the nuclear era these outdated dogmas feed a policy that could lead to universal conflagration.

SECOND. Our moratorium decision was based on the adherence of socialism as a social system to the cause of peace and a profound understanding of its responsibility for the destiny of civilization. As a socialist state and a nuclear power the Soviet Union considers it its lofty duty to do everything in its power to preserve a peaceful future for the planet.

Our desire to shift the course of international development onto the rails of detente accords with our philosophy and our socialist morality. But in the nuclear age saving the earth from atomic destruction is a task for all of mankind and the concern of all people.

THIRD. The modern world is complex, multifarious, and contradictory. And at the same time it is objectively becoming increasingly interdependent and integrated. This feature of the human community at the end of the 20th century is bound to be taken into account in foreign policy if it is realistically constructed. Otherwise there will be no normal international relations, and international relations will be doomed to proceed in a feverish way and lead ultimately to catastrophic confrontation.

Prenuclear thinking essentially lost its meaning on 6 August 1945. Today it is impossible to ensure one's own security without considering the security of other states and peoples. There can be no genuine security that is not identically equal and all-embracing. To think any other way means inhabiting a world of illusions, a world of self-deception.

The new kind of thinking that the modern world needs is incompatible with notions about its being some kind of patrimony and with attempts to "favor" others with one's patronage and with sermons about how they ought to behave and what path -- socialist, capitalist, or other -- they ought to choose. The Soviet Union considers that every people and every country has the right to dispose of its own fate and its own resources, to sovereignly determine its own social development, to defend its own security, and to participate in the organization of an all-embracing international security system.

The exacerbation of global problems is also characteristic of the present-day world. They cannot be solved without pooling the efforts of all states and people. The opening up of space and the ocean depths, ecology and epidemics, poverty and backwardness -- all these are realities of the age requiring international attention, international responsibility, and international cooperation. Thus many new world processes are linked together in a tight knot. Here is where disarmament could play a tremendous role by releasing a considerable portion of resources and intellectual and technical potential for creative needs.

Our foreign policy is inspired by the fact that there is a conviction becoming increasingly firmly established throughout the world in the mind of people and political and social forces of the most diverse leanings and philosophy -- the conviction that the very existence of the human species is now at stake and that the time for resolute and responsible action has come. It demands the utmost mobilization of reason and commonsense.

Two tragedies bound up with the technology of the nuclear-space era occurred recently: The loss of the crew of the Challenger and the accident at the Chernobyl AES. These incidents increased anxiety and brutally reminded us that people are still only learning to handle the fantastically powerful forces they themselves brought to life and are still only learning how to place them at the service of progress. Those events presented an object lesson in what will happen if nuclear weapons are used.

It is essential that all of us, but especially statesmen, draw specific and obvious lessons from it. The chief and perhaps most important lesson is that the weapons

created by mankind must never be used and that it is simply suicidal today to build interstate relations on the illusion of achieving superiority in these awesome instruments of annihilation.

Eliminating them completely is the sole path toward genuine peace. Embarking on such a path is tantamount to passing a maturity test. That concerns all political leaders on whom such a lofty mission common to all mankind has fallen.

It is necessary to learn to courageously face the facts: Specialists have calculated that the detonation of the smallest nuclear charge is equivalent in terms of the strength of its radiation to three Chernobyls. That is most probably correct. And, if so, that means that the detonation of even a small portion of the nuclear arsenal stockpiled will be nothing less than a catastrophe, and a catastrophe that is irremediable. And if some people nevertheless decide to deliver a first strike, then they will condemn themselves to an agonizing death -- an agonizing death resulting not even from a counterstrike but from the effects of the explosion of their own warheads.

That is not propaganda, political improvization, or "fearmongering" but a reality that is undeniable and simply irresponsible and criminal to disregard.

Objective and honest analysis of the realities dictates different approaches and a different world policy. These form the basis of the principled conclusions we have come to recently particularly at the 27th CPSU Congress.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT, IS BUILT ON AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROFOUND CHANGES IN THE WORLD

We consider the Soviet proposals made on 15 January this year on eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 are fully in accord with the demands of our era.

We have shown readiness to seek compromise solutions to problems that arouse dispute and suspicion.

The Soviet Union has put a package of constructive proposals on the table of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

In conjunction with our Warsaw Pact allies we have submitted a package of measures to cut armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. We want progress -- concerted and consistent progress -- in that sphere toward a lower and less dangerous level of military confrontation.

New proposals concerning chemical weapons have been submitted which, in our opinion, make it possible by as early as the end of this year or next to sign a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating the stocks of them as well as their industrial production base.

At the Stockholm conference the socialist countries, cooperating constructively with other participants, have done a great deal to find solutions [razvyazki] on key questions such as the nonuse of force, the notification of military exercises and troop movements, the exchange of annual plans of military activity, the invitation of observers, and verification [proverka].

We have put forward a broad platform for ensuring security and cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region and we invite everyone to take part in this process.

We have displayed initiative on cooperation with all interested states regarding creating international procedures [rezhim] for the safe development of the nuclear power industry.

Recently, as an alternative to the "star wars" program, we submitted to the United Nations a program for building "star peace" and creating a world space organization.

The 27th Congress formulated the basic principles of an all-embracing system of international security that is the most generalized expression of our new approaches in foreign policy. A few days ago the group of socialist countries officially referred the question of creating such a system for consideration by a routine UN General Assembly session.

At the same time I want to stress that, no matter how important and significant our proposals are and no matter how committed to them we are, we realize that we will not be able to do everything by ourselves. The problem of international security is a common problem and therefore a common concern and a common responsibility.

We study and take into account the viewpoints and initiatives of other governments and public and political movements when we formulate our proposals. We carefully see to it that equal security is envisaged for everyone at each stage of the implementation of these proposals. Nonetheless, we by no means regard them as definitive and as not subject to discussion. The road to overcoming the impasses of confrontation lies via dialogue, contacts, discussion, and talks. That is the only way to melt the ice of mutual distrust and to achieve practical results.

This also determines our attitude toward the problem of verification [kontrol] in resolving all disarmament questions. For instance, when we put forward our proposal on ending any nuclear explosions we stated that we had no objection to international verification [kontrol]. Our consent to the installation of American monitoring equipment near Semipalatinsk is clear proof of that. You might think the problem of verification [kontrol] had ceased to be an obstacle to the reaching of agreements. However, it is still stubbornly exploited in an attempt to conceal the real position -- a reluctance to disarm.

People of goodwill welcomed our decision on a moratorium on nuclear explosions. We heard words of approval and support from all parts of the world. Politicians, parliamentarians, public figures, and mass organizations saw this action as an example of the correct approach toward contemporary problems and as a hope of deliverance from the fear of nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet moratorium was approved by the UN General Assembly -- the world's most representative assembly of states.

We were supported by outstanding scientists -- physicists and physicians who probably have more of an idea than anyone of the dangers lurking in the atom. Our moratorium -- and I saw this for myself during my recent meeting with scientists in Moscow -- inspired members of the scientific community in various countries to take vigorous action.

However, in contrast to all these obvious, encouraging manifestations of the new way of thinking there is -- above all in the United States -- the militarization of political thinking, which in any case, among Western ruling circles, lags dangerously behind the process of profound changes in international life, while progress in science and technology forges on ahead of social and moral progress.

The right-wing militarist group in the United States, representing the mighty military-industrial complex, is simply crazy about the arms race. The interest here is probably threefold: not to allow the flow of profits from weapons production to dry up; to ensure U.S. military superiority; to attempt to drain the Soviet Union economically and weaken it politically; and, ultimately, to secure commanding positions in the world, fulfill ancient imperial ambitions, and continue to pursue the policy of plunder regarding the developing countries.

Hence the foreign policy for all its twists and turns and verbal adornments is based on dangerous misconceptions: on the underestimation of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the liberated states and on the overestimation of their own potential, which in turn fosters technological self-assurance and political license.

The fact that we are taking part in talks is interpreted by certain American politicians as the result of the growth of U.S. military might and the development [razrabotka] of the SDI program. While it bases its policy on such false premises the American Administration cannot take the path of honest agreements or the normalization of the international climate. All the same, it will have to reckon with the realities of life. You cannot get away from them.

As for our proposals, they, I repeat, arise from the realities of the modern world and are dictated not by weakness, but by awareness of a lofty responsibility for mankind's fate.

This is the current situation.

On one hand, our moratorium is in force and our large-scale compromise proposals have been announced and placed on the negotiating table at various forums. The pressure of peace-loving forces has increased considerably and there is heightened attention toward the problems of international security on the part of political circles, including official circles, which are concerned about the seriousness of the situation.

On the other hand, we have the refusal to stop nuclear tests, stubborn resistance to peace-loving initiatives, ostentatious contempt for the public's demands and the opinion of many authoritative parties and organizations, and disregard for the concern even of your own allies and your own people.

This is the state of affairs with which we, the Soviet leadership, are dealing at the moment of our moratorium's expiry.

What should we do? What is the choice? What decision will be the most correct, the most appropriate to the situation? What would do most to promote positive processes and lessen the threat of military confrontation?

Our people resolutely support the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and demand the persistent continuation of the foreign policy course of the 27th Congress. At the same time, in the letters and utterances of Soviet people there is a justified note of alarm: Is it expedient to maintain the moratorium, when nuclear explosions continue to ring out one after another in Nevada? Is not the risk too great, is not time working against the country's security? Indeed, the United States, having remained champions in terms of the number of explosions for 40 years, has exploded another 18 nuclear devices in the year of the Soviet moratorium. I repeat -- 18, 3 of which were not announced. And as a rule they did this ostentatiously, timing the tests to coincide either with our latest statement on the extension of the moratorium or with some new Soviet initiative or other. Moreover, they invited us to Nevada to see how it is done. It should be added that the present U.S. Administration is implementing the broadest military programs.

In a word, the Soviet Union certainly has sufficient grounds for resuming its own nuclear tests. All the same, we are even now convinced that the ending of nuclear tests not only by the Soviet Union, but by the United States too would be a real breakthrough toward halting the nuclear arms race and would accelerate the abolition of those arms. The logic is simple: If there are no tests, there will be no improvement of nuclear arms, of which both sides have already stockpiled more than enough.

This is indicated by the appeals addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union by a significant and authoritative section of the world community of states. Among them are the "Delhi Six" -- a standing forum of leaders of countries from four continents, Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden. The other day, at a meeting in Ixtapa, they adopted the "Mexican Declaration", which once again contains an appeal for an end to all nuclear explosions. That is also the demand of the majority of the states participating in the Nonaligned Movement.

We have received messages from political and public figures, private individuals, and organizations in many countries, including from the United States and other NATO states. They also appeal for the nonresumption of nuclear tests and for yet another chance for thought to be given to those who are insisting on nuclear explosions.

Of course we know, and I have already spoken about this, that there are forces active in the United States that in no way want to disarm. Moreover, they are doing everything to drag us into more and more spirals of the arms race and provoke us into slamming the door on talks.

But we would like to hope that realism and an understanding of the need to jointly seek ways to improve the international situation, end the senseless race, and eliminate nuclear weapons will gain the upper hand in American assessments and action.

At the same time we know with whom we are dealing. Therefore the country's security is a sacred matter for us. This must be clear to everybody. This is a question of principle.

We proceed from this when responding to any U.S. challenges, including the notorious SDI. Let there be no counting here on intimidating us or pushing us into unnecessary expenditure. If necessary we will rapidly find a response -- and it will not be the one expected by the United States [prichem budet on ne takim, kakim ego ozhidayut v SSSHA]. But it will be a response that will negate the value of [obstsenit] the "star wars" program. I have one objective in saying this: Let the real value of new military programs and the arms race as a whole be weighed again and again in the U.S. Administration from the viewpoint of the interests and security of the United States. For the main harm of SDI essentially lies in the fact that it undermines the prospects for talks and broadens the zone of mistrust. This is the whole problem. It is no less political than military. This is why we again call for movement away from a world armed to the limit to a world without weapons.

Thus, comrades, having comprehensively and scrupulously weighed all the "pros" and "cons" and guided by responsibility for the fate of peace, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Government of the Soviet Union have adopted a decision TO CONTINUE THE UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS UNTIL 1 JANUARY 1987.

In taking this step we believe that in all countries of the world, political circles, and the international public will correctly assess the protracted silence at Soviet nuclear test sites.

On behalf of the Soviet people I appeal to the reason and dignity of Americans -- not to miss once again a historic chance on the path toward ending the arms race.

I appeal to U.S. President Reagan to once again a dispassionate assessment of the situation that has developed, discard everything superficial, and overcome misconceptions about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

The Soviet Union is confident that an agreement on ending nuclear tests can be reached rapidly and signed THIS VERY YEAR AT A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING. This event would without any doubt be THE MAIN REAL RESULT OF THE MEETING and a significant step along the path of ending the arms race. It would be a kind of prologue to further progress at the talks on nuclear arms and their elimination and to a radical improvement in the entire situation in the world.

Being an action, not just a proposal, the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear explosions proves in practice the seriousness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament program and our appeals for a new policy -- a policy of realism, peace, and cooperation.

More than half of 1986 -- proclaimed International Year of Peace by the United Nations -- is behind us. In extending its unilateral moratorium the Soviet Union is making yet another weighty contribution to the common aspiration to ensure that this year goes down in history as a year worthy of its name.

This is the point of the Soviet Union's new political initiative.

This is the message our country is sending to the governments and peoples of all countries, and primarily the Government of the United States and the American people.

Thank you. Good night. [Moscow TASS in English at 1744 GMT, Moscow Domestic Service and Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT carry versions of the Gorbachev speech on 18 August which have been compared to the PRAVDA version and reveal no differences]

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CSO: 5200/1522

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

LE MONDE DISCUSSES GORBACHEV MORATORIUM DECISION

PM201102 Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Aug 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Mr Gorbachev's Goodwill"]

[Text] In announcing his decision to extend until early 1987 the moratorium on nuclear tests observed unilaterally by the USSR since August 1985, Mr Gorbachev is showing his goodwill. He will not be the one to jeopardize the very fragile hopes of a new detente, however difficult the dialogue with Mr Reagan might be. This clearly means that the Soviet leader wants this dialogue to continue, and hence that he deems it useful and constructive, even if this means implicitly contradicting the most authoritative Soviet commentators who constantly condemn Washington's false optimism and Mr Reagan's ultraconservatism.

Without wishing to be overoptimistic, surely this was inevitable. However wide the differences between the Soviets and Americans on the strategic arms question -- and hence on nuclear tests -- the fact is that they have not stopped talking. Their experts met in Moscow last week, and the same delegations are due to meet again in Washington next month. This proves that both sides at least think it important to listen to each other.

Since last winter there have been ups and downs in Soviet-American relations, with polemics frequently prevailing over the "spirit of Geneva," which emerged from the first meeting between Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev. However in the meantime the disagreements have been more clearly defined. The main one is on the "star wars" project so dear to the U.S. President, which the Soviets — whatever their own work in this sphere -- reject out of hand. But there are some signs which suggest that a compromise may not be impossible even in this sphere. Where does research — which Moscow is not insisting on banning -- end, and where does "deployment," which is regarded as unacceptable, start? The very idea of the moratorium which the USSR is applying to nuclear tests may be valid for space weapons, timing being a subject for negotiation.

The newest aspect of the present situation is that neither the Kremlin nor the White House can completely disregard their public opinions. Judging from the kind of letters published by the Soviet press, the Chernobyl disaster has left its mark and has produced a sensitivity to nuclear matters in the USSR which cannot completely spare military programs. Mr Gorbachev himself explicitly referred to this new phenomenon to justify his step. Washington may be wrong to regard it as merely a propaganda gesture.

However, it goes without saying that Mr Reagan's position is much more delicate from this viewpoint. The recent Congress votes on funding the strategic defense initiative and on nuclear tests have shown that the White House chief could not raise the stakes with Moscow beyond certain limits. This is especially true because elections scheduled for early November are likely to prove difficult for his party.

This is certainly a point which Mr Gorbachev will have taken into consideration in announcing the extension of his moratorium. But his decision may also be a way of forcing open the path to the new summit which both Moscow and Washington say they want and which the Soviet leader is calmly announcing for the end of the year.

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CSO: 5200/2744

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET JOURNAL ON NORDIC SECURITY, NFZ PROPOSALS

AU070601 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No. 7, Jul 86 (Signed to Press 13 Jun 86) pp 13-22

[Article by Yu. Komissarov: "Two Approaches to Security Problems in Northern Europe"]

[Excerpts] The concept of establishing a secure peace in the nuclear-space age, which was advanced in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, stems from the need for a resolute renunciation by all states of the old ways of thinking and acting, which for centuries have been based on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and military conflicts. The very dangerous atmosphere of nuclear confrontation requires new political thinking. Much in the Soviet platform of ensuring universal peace is directly addressed to Europe and is aimed at creating reliable security there based on the development of the Helsinki process and on a radical reduction in nuclear and conventional arms.

The exacerbated struggle between realism and "Atlanticism" over the cardinal issue of which direction international development will take -- the path of peace and detente or a further arms race leading to nuclear catastrophe -- is developing today not only in the West European countries that are at the center of military confrontation, but also in regions of the continent that have for a long time been regarded as being located sort of "on the periphery" of tension. The opposing trends in political thinking and practical policy are also making their presence felt in countries of the European north.

I.

Northern Europe has traditionally been considered as one of the most stable regions of the continent, and at the same time the many common features of the development of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden and their "northern" characteristics have been noted.

The very position of the three Scandinavian countries in NATO, as well as the nature of the commitments they have made, set them somewhat apart somewhat from other bloc members. Norway and Denmark are the only participants that have officially proclaimed a policy of not deploying foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. The demilitarized territory of the Spitsbergen archipelago, whose sovereignty was handed over to Norway by the 1920 Paris Treaty, has been removed from the NATO sphere of operations. Although Iceland, which is not part of the bloc's military organization, has provided a base for the U.S. Air Force in Keflavik, it also adheres to a course of preserving its nuclear-free status.

Adoption of the aforesaid restrictions, although done unilaterally and accompanied by a number of provisos, undoubtedly reflects a certain realism in the political thinking of the governments of these countries and their striving to consider the security interests of their neighbors to a certain degree. This position created -- and under the condition of its consistent implementation now still create -- opportunities for containing NATO's military infiltration of northern Europe. It is no accident that precisely the issue of the "nonbase" and "nonnuclear" policy of Scandinavian countries has become one of the main issues of the security problems of the European north; political passions are seething around it and it is constantly under consideration by all states that have or claim to have a bearing on this region.

Understanding that they cannot succeed in forcing the governments of Scandinavian countries to renounce their officially proclaimed policy, the United States and the NATO leadership adopted from the very beginning a course of "eroding" to the utmost the primary substance of this policy. Unfortunately, they have had considerable success in this.

The continuing deployment of new American medium-range missiles, including cruise missiles, in Western Europe is also substantially affecting the military-strategic situations in the region. The point is that the flight trajectories of cruise missiles designed to make a strike on the USSR will pass through the airspace of north European states. The problems that arise with regard to the possible use of long-range cruise missiles, which U.S. ships and aviation operating in the North Atlantic are armed with, are also obvious. The changes that have occurred in recent years in the military-strategic situation in northern Europe were quite fully described by K. Thyberg, a prominent Swedish expert on security problems (and currently Swedish ambassador to Helsinki): "Northern Europe can no longer be considered as being on the periphery, located at a secure distance from the major crisis centers."

"Today it is a central strategic region where the interests of both alliances will be affected if a military conflict breaks out in Europe." (Footnote 1) (HELSINGEN SANOMAT, 25 February 1985) Of the same opinion is Finnish researcher (P. Yoenniemi), who notes that "changes in relations between the great powers and in their policies also significantly affect changes in the foundations of the security of northern Europe." (Footnote 2) (KALEVA, 18 October 1985) The intensification of U.S. military activity within NATO, the participation of individual Scandinavian countries in this bloc, and their involvement in its aggressive preparations have been and are the main factors threatening the foundations of peace in this region. That is why in the current complicated international situation, the preservation and development of all that is positive in the policies of north European countries, which in its totality opposes "Atlanticism" and ensures genuine security are so important, and specifically: Finland's policy as defined by the 1948 treaty, Sweden's neutrality, the "nonbase" and "nonnuclear" policies of Norway and Denmark, and Iceland's nuclear-free status.

III.

Under the conditions of a real threat of nuclear war and in the face of U.S. aspirations to turn all of Western Europe into its nuclear missile arsenal, the idea of proclaiming this region as a nuclear-free zone is of particular importance. The differences in an "Atlanticist" and genuinely national approach are patently manifest in this vitally important issue for north European peoples. If the idea, proposed more than 2 decades ago by Finnish President U. Kekkonen, of a nuclear-free north was in fact simply rejected by Scandinavian countries as "unnecessary" and "unrealistic," not one north European government now opposes its discussion. Moreover, not only neutral Sweden, but also Norway, Denmark, and Iceland have officially declared their positive attitude, in principle, to Finland's proposal. Since 1982 this issue has been discussed at meetings of the northern countries' foreign ministers, and at a number of them reports have been prepared by special governmental commissions. A conference of the northern countries' parliamentarians was held in Copenhagen in November 1985; it was devoted to the problems of a nuclear-free zone and in which government representatives of Finland, Sweden, and Denmark also took part. The slogan "A Nuclear-Free Status for Northern Europe" has become a central demand of the growing antiwar movement in Scandinavia. The aforesaid evolution is evidence that the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe is gradually gathering strength and is becoming a real factor in shaping the foreign policy thinking of responsible politicians in the region's countries. At the same time it should be noted that approaches to the problems of a nuclear-free north by individual countries and various political forces within each of them are still far from uniform. If there have been quite substantial advances in Sweden's position, particularly after the coming to power of O. Palme's Social Democratic government in 1982, the Governments of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are still acting on this issue along NATO lines and surrounding their position with a number of provisos and conditions, which hamper transferring the problems of creating a nuclear-free zone onto a practical plane. Significant in this regard is a report by a special commission of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (the so-called (Colding) Commission) (Footnote 3) (See AFSENPOSTEN, 26 November 1985) published at the end of November 1985 -- a few days before the parliamentarians' conference in Copenhagen (which was assessed as a desire to influence its work). What conditions do the authors of the report advance? Many of them are not new (they are also shared by other Scandinavian NATO member-countries), but they are formulated with premeditated harshness. Thus, the need is stressed again to resolve the issue only in a general European context and make it dependent on the results of talks on disarmament in Europe. Considering the complexity of these talks, which have been conducted for more than a year, and some of them for more than a decade, this formulation of the issue actually postpones indefinitely the prospect for implementing Finland's proposal.

It is necessary to stress the importance of the statement by Finnish Foreign Minister P. Vayrynen that the relationship with other steps of arms limitation in Europe "should not be an obstacle to the advancement of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. Moreover, broad European solutions could also gain impetus from efforts in the north concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone." (Footnote 4) (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 24 November 1985) Addressing the conference in Copenhagen, O. Palme stressed: "We cannot isolate ourselves from what is happening in the surrounding world. At the same time it is important that we do not condemn ourselves to passivness and agree to be only pawans in the big game." (Footnote 5) (DAGENS NYHETER, 29 November 1985)

It is clear that steps such as proclaiming northern Europe a nuclear-free zone or the proposal by Sweden to create a corridor free from being a nuclear weapons battlefield in central Europe, which are important in themselves, would promote achievement of the end goal -- freeing the entire European continent from tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons.

The aforesaid report by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry commission in fact again raised the question about including the northwestern regions of the Soviet Union in a nuclear-free zone: "The zone's network should not just be limited to the territory of Nordic countries. It should also affect the nuclear weapons deployed in adjacent regions, primarily those on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic Sea region." Also advanced is a new requirement of limiting conventional arms in these regions "in view of the Soviet Union's clear superiority in them." The same requirement is addressed to the Polish People's Republic and the GDR. The "(Colding) Commission" goes further still, insisting on the "accessibility of the appropriate regions of the Soviet Union to verification by other interested states."

We know that at one time the Soviet Union considered it possible to accommodate a number of the wishes of the Nordic countries and stated its readiness to examine questions about certain -- moreover, substantial -- measures applicable to its own territory in the region adjacent to a future nuclear-free zone. This was done with the aim of promoting the creation of favorable conditions for implementing this idea. This step by the Soviet Union was highly assessed by the north European countries.

As regards the far-reaching demands made by Norway, it should not be forgotten that the defense measures taken by the Soviet Union in its northwestern regions, including the Kola Peninsula, have never had a regional orientation, and have not and do not threaten the security of the countries of northern Europe, but were due to a need to restore the global military-strategic parity violated by the United States and NATO toward the beginning of the sixties. The Soviet Union is a nuclear power, and to make certain special demands on it just on the basis that some of its regions border on an eventual nuclear-free zone is illegal.

This also applies to the issue of verification, which also must be examined on a broader international plane. Now this issue, as it is formulated by Norway, very much recalls the demands for "transparency" that the NATO countries are trying to promote so persistently at the conference in Stockholm. On the whole the USSR's measures as applied to its own territory in the region adjacent to a future nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, like the idea of creating this zone itself, should apparently be considered in the context of efforts to strengthen confidence and security.

As noted in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, states are taking these measures proceeding from a desire to strengthen confidence among each other and thereby promoting the strengthening of stability and security in Europe and a reduction in the danger of armed conflict.

It is also appropriate to mention the discussion that has recently been held on issues associated with the Baltic Sea. Taking into account the dispositions in Scandinavian states, in 1983 the Soviet Union declared its readiness to discuss with interested parties the issue of providing a nuclear-free status to the waters of the Baltic. Later, assertions appeared within certain circles in Scandinavian countries that the USSR had altered its position and intended to consider the issue of a nuclear-free status for the Baltic Sea in connection with more general problems of security in Europe.

Of course, the state of affairs in the Baltic is an issue whose substance is associated not only with northern Europe but goes beyond this region. But the logic, according to which the possibility and reality of a nuclear-free status for Scandinavian countries is dependent on removing nuclear weapons from the seas surrounding it, is obvious. The relevance of this formulation of the issue was stressed by the participation of American warships equipped with nuclear cruise missiles in recent NATO maneuvers in the Baltic and their entry into the territorial waters of Sweden and Denmark.

A nuclear-free status for the water of the Baltic Sea would substantially strengthen peace and stability in the entire region of northern Europe. Of course, there are a number of specific aspects here associated with the presence of international waters in the Baltic and with the interests of other Baltic states. But this is now an issue of specific talks with the interested countries.

One must see that the aforesaid provisos, doubts, and hesitation displayed in certain Scandinavian circles concerning the idea of a nuclear-free zone in many respects reflect the abruptly negative position of Washington and the NATO leadership on this issue. Incidentally, the governments of Norway and Denmark do not conceal the fact that without coming to an understanding with their Atlantic partners, they will not agree to any nuclear-free settlement.

Meanwhile, Washington's position is quite definite. It considers that nuclear-free commitments by its Scandinavian allies would strike a blow at the nuclear strategy of the North Atlantic bloc and the concepts of a "first strike" and a "limited nuclear war." As early as 1981, the American Administration frankly stated to the Norwegian Government that the creation of a nuclear-free zone does not comply with NATO interests. During a periodic trip to Finland in September 1985, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle, having called the idea of a nuclear-free zone "senseless," again discussed a "nuclear threat from the Soviet Union."

Further advancement of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe largely depends on whether the governments of Scandinavian NATO member-countries further equate their posture with the bloc's negative attitude or whether a constructive and realistic approach to a paramount security problem for their countries and the region as a whole prevails. The social democrats, communists, and a number of other Norwegian and Danish parties demand precisely this approach. On the eve of parliamentary elections in 1985 the Norwegian Labor Party repeatedly supported an invigoration of efforts to create a nuclear-free zone and confirmed this position after coming to power in May 1986.

At the initiative of the Danish Social Democratic Party and other parties comprising the so-called antimissile majority in the Danish Foketing, a resolution was again adopted calling on the government to actively work towards creating a nuclear-free zone. In the spring of 1985 the Icelandic Althing opposed the deployment of nuclear missile weapons in the country.

Clarifying his idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe in 1978, U. Kekkonen raised the question about the participation of nuclear powers in this settlement. O. Palme also more than once expressed the view that a condition for creating the zone must be a commitment by nuclear powers to respect its nuclear-free status, "to make a clear and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against our countries."

This position met with understanding from the Soviet Union, which has frequently declared its readiness to be a guarantor, either unilaterally or together with other nuclear powers, of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. Guarantees of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against the states included in the zone is the main and, unquestionably, the most important condition for ensuring their nuclear-free status.

It is no accident that certain circles in Scandinavia that are oriented toward Washington are seeking to sow doubts about the effectiveness of such guarantees. The already mentioned report by the "(Colding) Commission" asserts: "Regardless of the substance of the security guarantees by the nuclear powers, the main question arises: To what extent can one believe the statements made, particularly in a crisis situation or when a threat of war arises?"

As regards the Soviet Union, it has always strictly fulfilled the political, juridical, and moral commitments it has made. It is prepared to formalize its guarantees concerning a nuclear-free zone at any time, not only in the form of a unilateral declaration, but also by concluding either a multilateral agreement in which it takes part or bilateral agreements with each country included in the zone.

The 27th CPSU Congress very definitely confirmed that the Soviet Union will support the adoption of measures promoting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of zones free from these and other mass destruction weapons. In April the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member-states addressed an appeal to European states, the United States, and Canada to take energetic action to carry out proposals to create nuclear weapon-free zones on the European Continent and expressed a readiness to take part in conducting an in-depth and specific exchange of views aimed at promoting the implementation of practical steps to create nuclear-free zones in northern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviet Union's principled approach to issues associated with proclaiming northern Europe a nuclear weapon-free zone was reaffirmed during the official visit to our country by Swedish Prime Minister I. Carlsson in April 1986.

It should be noted that the program of establishing a secure peace advanced by the Soviet Union itself proposes a whole package of measures whose implementation would already in the immediate future promote a strengthening of security and stability in northern Europe. Is not clear, for instance, that reaching agreement on a total end to nuclear tests would create favorable conditions for ensuring the nuclear-free status of the European north? The implementation of the USSR's proposal on the total elimination of American and its own medium-range missiles in the entire -- without any bounds -- European zone would serve the same purpose. The problem of using sea- and air-based long-ranged cruise missiles, which is worrying northern European countries, could be largely solved if the USSR and the United States, as early as the first phase, cut by half the nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory and establish sharply reduced total ceilings on all nuclear weapons.

IV.

The American "star wars" plans have produced an ambiguous reaction in northern European countries. To put it more precisely, the overwhelming majority of politicians and the broad public immediately understood the danger that launching an arms race in space carried with it. At the same time, the question of "Atlanticist solidarity" arose for the countries participating in NATO

Finland and Sweden took a distinct and unambiguous position. Finnish President M. Koivisto declared the impermissibility of using outer space for military purposes. The Swedish Government condemned U.S. plans to create a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. O. Palme was one of the authors of a declaration by the leaders of six states (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden) that contains an appeal to stop the arms race on earth and not to permit one beginning in space.

As regards Norway and Denmark, they became a target for direct pressure from the United States, which was trying to include them in the implementation of SDI.

The leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party demanded that the conservative government then in power oppose implementation of programs aimed at developing and producing space-strike weapons. As its deputy K. Frydenlund (currently foreign minister) stressed, "Norway should not support American plans for the militarization of space, it should warn the United States about the dangerous consequences of their implementation." (Footnote 6) (ARBEIDERBLADET, 6 November 1985)

Norway's conservative government, although it tried to vindicate SDI as a supposedly induced necessity to "respond to the Soviet Union," nonetheless declared its refusal to take part, at the state level, in research within the framework of the program proposed by the United States. At the same time Norwegian firms and scientific research centers were given the "green light" to take part in this research.

Copenhagen's position regarding SDI is defined in Folketing resolutions of 26 March and 14 May 1985 directed against U.S. military-space programs. According to the resolutions, Denmark not only opposes deployment of weapons in outer space and participation in the scientific research and development of these weapons; an obligation is placed on the country's government to actively work toward ensuring this as NATO's position in all appropriate international organizations. Adhering to this, Denmark, together with certain other NATO countries, has managed to secure renunciation of a mention of American military space programs in communiques of NATO's Military Planning Committee, Eurogroup, and the spring session of the Council. It is typical that during Prime Minister P. Schluter's official visit to Washington in the fall of 1985, dissatisfaction was expressed to him over the independence displayed by his government.

In connection with the U.S. refusal to join the moratorium on nuclear explosions proclaimed by the Soviet Union, and the American Administration's continuation of tests of explosive devices in Nevada, the governments of Scandinavian NATO member-countries, although declining to directly condemn these steps and restricting themselves just to expressing "regret" again stressed the need for very quickly reaching agreement on a total ban on nuclear weapon tests. For instance, the Danish Government called on nuclear powers to begin, as quickly as possible, talks aimed at concluding a nuclear test ban treaty subject to international verification.

Sweden is actively working on the issues of preventing a nuclear war. The precepts of the Soviet concept of security through disarmament and by eliminating the nuclear threat have much in common with the thoughts expressed in the messages of the leaders of the "Delhi Group of Six" to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Swedish Government welcomed the USSR's decision to continue the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests until 6 August 1986. Having assumed the post of Swedish prime minister, I. Carlsson declared his intention to actively continue the line toward eliminating the nuclear threat.

The countries of northern Europe express the hope that the Soviet-American dialogue that originated with the summit meeting in Geneva does not break down. Finnish President M. Koivisto, having noted the importance of deepening mutual understanding between the great powers on the issue of further measures that could lay the basis for new agreements in the sphere of disarmament, stressed in this regard the urgency of a total nuclear test ban.

The long-term security interests of the north European states have never contradicted and will never contradict the security interests of the Soviet Union: of course, with the understanding that the point is to preserve and strengthen peace and stability in this part of Europe. The Soviet Union is far from indifferent to whether a further buildup of U.S. and NATO military preparations is carried out in the region located in the immediate vicinity of USSR borders or to whether a realistic approach prevails based on a rejection of outmoded stereotypes of military-political thinking and on an ability to search and find solutions that would comply with the objective requirements of peoples and with the realities of the contemporary world.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1986.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

HELSINKI PAPER VIEWS FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR NORDIC ZONE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Jul 86 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Basic Facts in the Zone Issue"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] The many studies concerning the Nordic nuclear-free zone may seem to be a kind of pastime, considering that conditions for real negotiations on the zone are lacking, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson in this commentary on the recently published official Finnish report. It should be remembered, however, that the zone issue is an integral part of our foreign policy, whose profile would be changed completely without it.

In itself, the report on the Nordic nuclear-free zone that was submitted to the minister of foreign affairs a few days ago is a good and sober piece of work. The group's chairman was Under Secretary of State Klaus Tornudd, whose name is usually the guarantee of an analytical grasp of the work to be done.

The task force's primary mission was to provide a basis for future discussions and joint Nordic reports. The report fulfills that mission very well despite its limited format. It also provides a larger public with basic facts that are useful in the slowly advancing debate on the zone issue.

One can therefore say that the report provides, in concentrated form, the necessary knowledge about the concept of a "nuclear-free zone," about such zones in general, both those in existence and those that are merely being proposed, about the discussion at the United Nations concerning nuclear-free zones and the problem's relationship with the nonproliferation treaty, about the history of the zone initiative and the way it has been handled by the various Nordic countries and the nuclear powers, and about the practical and technical problems involved in implementing the zone plan.

Concerning actual political stands, however, the report is restrained. In that respect, it differs from Norway's well-known Colding Report, among others (see the editorial that appeared in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET on 28 November 1985). The Colding Report had to take a stand on the specific questions involved in the possibilities for setting up a Nordic nuclear-free zone as part of a wider European arrangement and within the framework of Norway's commitments as part

of an alliance. It is true that Tornudd's task force also had the job of presenting a general picture of Finland's stand on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region. This was accomplished primarily by presenting a concise outline of Finland's attitude, and the report is cautious on the subject of really new proposals.

One reason for the task force's restraint is surely to be found in the fact that Finnish contributions in connection with the zone issue have been made at the highest level, whereas the rest of the discussion has been primarily a matter of exegesis. As the report points out, the basis for Finland's positions has consistently been the two speeches by President Kekkonen in 1963 and 1978 and the later amplifications by President Koivisto.

Among us, therefore, the zone initiative has had a formal character, with the result that there has been little room for any possible criticisms or for additional viewpoints going beyond the limits established by the foreign policy leaders. And naturally, if this is true of the public debate, it is especially true within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose job it is to carry out the intentions of the foreign policy leaders.

But this does not mean that the authors of the report may not come up with worthwhile formulations and clarifications. For example, it is emphasized that in adopting its stands, Finland is not taking a position on the motives or attitudes of the other partners. Finland bases its stands on its "established points of reference." There have been occasional comments lately to the effect that Finland has been rather quiet in the Nordic debate, but part of the reason, obviously, has been that it has not wanted to deviate from the policy already established.

The report lists under six points the principles that have guided Finnish policy on the zone issue. Among other things, it is stated that the Nordic countries must first agree on what they want to achieve by establishing a zone and then negotiate the details. Each country's basic decisions concerning security policy are to be respected, and each state is to define its own security requirements. The nuclear powers are to be allowed to present their viewpoints at an early stage of the negotiations. On the other hand, they must give the zone states so-called negative security guarantees by pledging, among other things, not to violate the airspace of the latter states with nuclear weapons. The wording is enlightening, even though most of it was also part of Kekkonen's speech in Stockholm in 1978. The talk about guarantees that no outsider will violate the airspace of the zone states with nuclear weapons has reference very especially to cruise missiles. The emphasis on the dangers of cruise missiles can be said to be part of the specifically Finnish viewpoints in the discussion.

Incidentally, much of what is interesting in the report is hidden in the section called "Main Issues in Implementation of the Zone." Concerning the geographical extent of the zone, there is rejection--once again--of a "minizone" consisting only of Sweden and Finland. The fact that a zone should form a geographical whole leads to the conclusion in the report that Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark constitute the minimum necessary for creating a

nuclear-free zone. Concerning Iceland, the report says cautiously that it would be "helpful" if that country were part of the zone. Nor can the Danish and Norwegian islands in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean be automatically included in the zone.

The report also deals with the controversial questions of the status of the Baltic Sea and of the "buffer zones" surrounding the Nordic Region as far as a nuclear-free zone is concerned. Concerning the Baltic Sea, the report enumerates the many problems that will arise if an attempt is made to include that inland sea in the zone. A large part of the Baltic consists of international waters, and special agreements will therefore be required with the nuclear powers in particular if they are to refrain from bringing nuclear-armed units into those waters. In addition, some of the Baltic Sea's coastal states are not part of the Nordic Region, and their territorial waters can be closed to nuclear weapons only through special agreements.

Concerning the "buffering" of the existence of nuclear weapons in the Nordic Region's immediate vicinity, it is noted that the report mentions not only the Soviet Union's areas in the north but also the West German territory bordering on Denmark.

Finland's cautious stand on both issues shows up clearly. Finland obviously assigns priority to the "core zone" indicated by Kekkonen in his day--that is, the four Nordic continental countries. It is emphasized, to be sure, that a consequence of Finland's general position is that having a nuclear-free Baltic Sea and an agreement on the "buffer zones" would be desirable. But one gets the indirect impression that it is chiefly the interests of the other Nordic countries that would be affected by this.

In its conclusions, the task force emphasizes that "so far the conditions have not existed" for presenting the governments of the other Nordic countries with proposals concerning a zone and conducting negotiations on such a zone. It therefore recommends further studies, debate, and attempts to promote disarmament at the general European level. The most specific proposal concerns a joint Nordic committee to investigate the zone issue. This will be brought up at the next meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in August.

Since it is more than uncertain that the conditions for specific negotiations concerning a zone will improve in the foreseeable future, the many studies may seem to be a kind of pastime. But it should be remembered that the zone proposal is, once and for all, an integral part of Finland's foreign policy. That policy would change completely if the zone idea were to be dropped in one way or another.

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CSO: 5200/2731

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

CONSERVATIVE DAILY ON LATEST FINNISH NORDIC ZONE INITIATIVE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Jul 86 p2

[Editorial: "Nordic Area And Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] "The Nordic area has always been free of nuclear weapons. There is no reason to expect that this stabilized state of affairs should change. Its preservation and reinforcement is of primary importance to Finland. Finland's initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone is aimed at this." This was the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry's work group in a recent report.

By joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty all the Nordic countries have given up the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition, Sweden and Finland have declared, in particular, that under no circumstances will foreign nuclear weapons be allowed on their territories. Even the NATO countries of Norway and Denmark have declared that in peacetime they will not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil.

In theory it is possible that Norway and Denmark will be defended by NATO's nuclear weapons in time of war. In practice this nuclear weapons option is, however, militarily meaningless. If the nuclear weapons threshold is crossed, it will not make any sense or even be possible to transfer nuclear weapons to Norwegian and Danish soil so that they can be fired from there.

Norway's and Denmark's nuclear weapons option is important primarily from a political point of view, above all, from the point of view of NATO's internal stability. Therefore, the whole idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area has frequently been labeled in NATO's circles as an attempt to drive a wedge between the member countries.

Often it has been explained that the creation of a nuclear-free zone as well as the guarantees given by the nuclear states would protect the Nordic area from a nuclear war. The superpowers have, however, promised to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons and force, in general, many times already. It is doubtful that new guarantees will be any more reliable, at least not in a situation in which the fate of a superpower is hanging in the balance.

The whole concept of a zone makes sense only if its realization will reduce a threat directed at the Nordic area in peacetime. There has been talk about

special dilution arrangements in the other Nordic countries. For example, it has been thought that the Soviet Union could reciprocally remove such nuclear weapons in the immediate area whose potential targets are in the zone to be formed. On the other hand, it has, however, been confirmed that it does not make any difference whether nuclear weapons deployed in the vicinity of the Nordic area or nuclear weapons transported by aircraft and submarines threaten the Nordic area. In referring to reciprocity the reduction of conventional military forces has also been considered.

In the work group's report it states that Finland has not taken a position on possible dilution arrangements; they are an "important negotiable question", which can be dealt with once negotiations have commenced.

According to the work group, it is essential that the nuclear states respect the position of the zone and agree to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against the countries in the zone or from threatening them with nuclear weapons. Finland also wants to include in such negative security guarantees an agreement which prohibits the transit of cruise missiles.

The guarantees of the nuclear states can entail problems other than the one of surveillance considered by the work group. The superpowers may attach conditions for such guarantees which they would then use as a means of interfering in the affairs of the Nordic area. For example, Ola Ullsten said while being Sweden's foreign minister that a zone could entail "agreements which would reduce our freedom of movement or would weaken confidence in Sweden's nonaligned state and neutrality". The work group also did not consider the effect of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact in the question of guarantees.

At least there is reason to praise the Foreign Ministry's work group for its realism. A good example of this is the listing of means by which the Finnish Government can directly promote the zone project in the near future: the maintenance of its own readiness to negotiate, the compiling of a joint Nordic report as well as the public presentation of the project, and the encouragement of a public debate concerning it.

Above all, a debate on a Nordic nuclear-free zone will be seen as a means by which relations between the countries can be generally improved and tensions can be eliminated in Northern Europe. In this respect the initiative has already had a chance to have a considerable effect in the last 20 years.

10576
CSO: 5200/2729

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

CANADIAN EDITORIAL WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF TALKS

Vancouver THE SUN in English 17 Jul 86 p B4

[Text]

Whispers of progress in superpower arms negotiations on several fronts seem to be borne out by the agreement to at least talk again about banning nuclear tests.

Interestingly, the Soviet Union made the first announcement of this in London, where Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has been holding pointedly friendly talks with the British. But it was confirmed by the United States that there will be a meeting in Geneva next week.

The impetus may have been the apparent determination of the Soviets to end their moratorium on testing in early August, more than any Soviet attempt to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe.

Although the Americans have never acknowledged that it was anything more than a public relations gimmick, and refused to stop their testing, there has been increasing pressure from allies and domestically for the U.S. to respond to the Soviet moratorium.

More complaints from Mikhail Gorbachev about the failure of the U.S. to respond to a number of recent Soviet proposals have added to the pressure. But in fact the test ban treaty is an idea whose time has come. The sticking point has always been fears that it would be impossible to verify compliance. But the U.S. recently has been slightly more encouraging on the subject of on-site verification and a group of American scientists has privately arranged with the Soviet Union to set up monitoring equipment in the chief Soviet test zone.

In the U.S., meanwhile, Democrats preparing for the next presidential election, in 1988, including Senator Gary Hart, have served notice that they expect a test ban treaty to be a major campaign issue.

It would certainly be to the Reagan administration's advantage to make progress on a test ban and, whatever the reason on either side, the resumption of talks must be welcomed.

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CSO: 5220/52

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY VIEWS U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR TESTS DISPUTE

HK240230 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 23 Aug 86 p 6

[**"Roundup"** by Zhang Liang: "The Argument Over the Nuclear Testing Issue"]

[Text] On 18 August, Soviet leader Gorbachev extended until 1 January next year the time limit for a halt to all nuclear tests, originally set for 6 August, and continued to demand that the United States follow the Soviet example. However, the United States, giving as its reason that halting nuclear tests now "is not in U.S. security interests," again rejected this Soviet proposal. This is the fourth U.S.-Soviet clash over the nuclear tests issue in a year. It shows that the two sides still diverge widely in their stand on this issue.

This argument over the nuclear testing issue began at the end of July 1985. At that time, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal on "halting tests" and decided that it would unilaterally halt all nuclear tests from 6 August that year (the 40th anniversary of the dropping of the first U.S. atomic bomb on Hiroshima) until 1 January 1986. The Soviet Union also appealed to the United States to follow suit. On the day of this Soviet announcement, the United States announced that President Reagan had written to Gorbachev inviting the Soviet Union to send observers to Nevada to monitor the nuclear tests. The two sides rejected each other's proposals. The United States described the Soviet proposal for a temporary test halt as a "propaganda trick" that would not allow for verification. The Soviet Union, for its part, said that inviting the Soviet Union to send observers to the nuclear tests showed a desire to "legalize" the tests. After that, the Soviet Union took every opportunity to repeatedly raise the proposal for a bilateral Soviet-U.S. halt on testing. On 15 January and 10 May this year. The Soviet Union announced further extensions to the temporary halt in tests, to last until 6 August, while the United States adopted, as before, an attitude of boycotting the proposal. In order to ban nuclear tests, Gorbachev indicated a desire to hold a special meeting with Reagan in Europe to discuss the issue. The United States, for its part, said that summit talks "should embrace all questions in U.S.-Soviet relations," and was not willing to hold a high-level meeting only to discuss the test ban issue.

In the past year, the Soviet Union has extended the test halt three times to put pressure on the United States in a bid to force it to give way and put a halt to the necessary U.S. tests being carried out in order to improve its weapons. However, the United States has come up with all sorts of reasons to withstand the Soviet pressure and not give an inch. It has also carried out 18 underground nuclear tests. The two sides have waged a war of words during this period, which seems to have never stopped. The Soviet Union has accused the United States of following a "principle of nuclear confrontation" by rejecting a halt on tests, "thereby wrecking the efforts to stop the

arms race," in a bid to gain "nuclear superiority" over the Soviet Union. For its part, the United States has countered that the aim of the Soviet Union in currently calling for a joint U.S.-Soviet halt to nuclear tests is to "freeze Soviet nuclear superiority" and block U.S. efforts to improve its deterrent forces. At the same time, the two sides have exerted themselves in defending their stands. One side says that halting nuclear tests is the most practical way in striving to halt the arms race; the other says that the verification technology needed for halting nuclear tests is not yet complete, hence verification is impossible. As far as arms control is concerned, the U.S. goal is to greatly reduce the offensive nuclear weapons of both sides.

It is not difficult to see that the attempts of the two sides to gain military superiority lurk behind this argument. According to analysis by Western public opinion, there is at present a rough parity between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, with the Soviet Union holding an advantage in certain fields. Taking into account the requirements for its domestic economic development, the Soviet Union hopes to maintain this parity and is worried that the United States will gain military superiority by means of its "star wars" scheme. It therefore regards wrecking this U.S. scheme as its top priority. This is the real reason why the Soviet Union has repeatedly extended its halt on nuclear tests and called on the United States to do the same. TASS, too, has stated it with great clarity: "A halt to tests of nuclear weapons for use in space is a serious obstacle on the road to U.S. accomplishment of its star wars scheme." The reason the United States has adopted a hardline approach and refused to halt nuclear tests is that it has to correct imbalances in nuclear armaments, and carrying out such tests for a certain period is essential in order to maintain the reliability of the existing nuclear weapons and to research a new generation of nuclear weapons. The United States has therefore repeatedly stressed that to halt these now would not be in the security interests of itself and its allies. Of course, the United States does not want to fall into the "trap" of the Soviet demand for a test halt, which would restrain "star wars" research.

In short, the argument between "halting tests" and "being opposed to halting tests" is not an isolated affair. It is a question of substance involving U.S.-Soviet rivalry for military superiority. Hence, certain arms control experts in the West hold that the United States and the Soviet Union "simply cannot agree to sign a treaty on the all-round banning of nuclear weapons test" in the near future.

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CSO: 5200/4069

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: MORE ON GORBACHEV VLADIVOSTOK ASIAN SECURITY PROPOSALS

'Pacific Helsinki' Urged

LD011320 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 31 Jul 86

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Posner; with panelists Professor Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States and Canada Institute in Moscow]

[Excerpts] [Posner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen.

Eleven years ago on 1 August 1975 the Helsinki accords were signed. They were the result of a tremendous amount of work, of effort, on the part of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, of all nations that were interested in arriving at a new level of cooperation in Europe. A year ago, on 30 July 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral nuclear test ban including tests for peaceful needs. In the light of those two very important events, I would like us today to look at, assess, and analyze the speech made by the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev, in Vladivostok, and basically the proposals concerning Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin.

[Bogdanov] [passage omitted] Let me make it absolutely clear: For the first time for the last 14 years we, I mean the Soviet Union, goes to the Pacific area and states what its policy is in the Pacific area. That is for the first time, and that (?gives me the right), and I'm telling that to all of my friends and colleagues, that it's a great opening. I quote, it's a great opening to the Pacific area. That's a great program we suggest to the Pacific countries, what to do, how to organize our lives, [words indistinct] that will be peaceful. If you like, it's a kind of Pacific Helsinki, if I may call it so. It's a Pacific Helsinki.

[Posner, interrupting] Let me just interrupt you for 1 minute there, and I hope you're not going to forget what you wanted to say, because I think that you've touched on an extremely important aspect, and I'd like your opinion on this, Dr Plekhanov. Helsinki was a specifically European endeavor, and the fact that Canada and the United States, two non-European countries, were and are involved, does in no way distract from the fact because they are part of the alliance, and obviously Europe is very much in the minds of the policies of those two countries. The question I'd like to ask you is: Do you believe that a Helsinki approach is possible vis-a-vis Asia and the Pacific Ocean?

And the reason I ask you this is Europe is a continent that is far smaller than that part of the world and would seem to have more in common as an entity than something as broad as the Asian-Pacific area. Therefore, I would like to ask you, especially considering that this is an anniversary, if you wish, of the Helsinki accord, and that, indeed, as Dr Bogdanov noted, we have a statement here of Soviet vision, of the possible development of that whole area, do you think a Helsinki approach is realistic?

[Plekhanov] I think that's the only approach that is unacceptable, precisely because there's so much diversity, precisely because there are so many various interests involved in the Asia-Pacific area. That is the approach that should be tried. [passage omitted] Of course it will take into account the particulars of the Asian-Pacific situation and of course it will be in many ways different, but basically it's live and let live. Let's not build up arms, let's trade more rather than threaten more. Those pieces of wisdom, those grains of wisdom that lie at the basis of the Helsinki process should lie at the basis of the Asia-Pacific cooperation. [passage omitted]

[Posner] Another question perhaps on a slightly different plane, and incidentally I'd like to tell our listeners that today we're looking at these broader issues and in our next issue of Top Priority we will look at the concrete issues that were picked up and selected and discussed in the speech by the general secretary, so we promise you that, but getting back to another general question; the unilateral nuclear test ban imposed as of 6 August 1985 by the Soviet Union on itself and announced on 30 July of that same year; do you think it also has some implications for the Asian-Pacific basin. What is your feeling about that? Do you think it has some promise, or what would do? [as heard]

[Plekhanov] Well, I think it has had a direct impact. For one thing, the People's Republic of China stopped its atmospheric testing in early April of this year....

[Posner] '86

[Plekhanov] '86, yes, and by the way it was done on the day that the United States made another test of its nuclear weapons -- I think there's some symbolism there....

[Posner] There's also some irony.

[Plekhanov] There's also some irony, yes. Of course nuclearization of the Pacific, of the Asian-Pacific area, would be a great tragedy, precisely because there are so many explosive situations there.

[Bogdanov] And it's very populated there.

[Plekhanov] And it's a very populated area, and one must also take into account that during the war in Korea the United States did threaten to use nuclear weapons, to drop nuclear bombs on Korea. In '54 it seriously considered dropping a nuclear bomb on Vietnam and, by the way, the only nuclear weapons ever dropped on anybody were used in Asia, and the interesting thing was that when those war plans were considered a not insignificant factor in making the decision, was that well, those people are just Asians, and you know, so there was a racist implication in that; white people considering Asians, and you know, so there was a racist implication in that; white people considering the yellow people expendable; somehow of a lower order. [passage omitted]

Broadcast to China

OW202119 Moscow in Mandarin to China 0700 GMT 1 Aug 86

[Mulatov commentary]

[Text] People's Korea, Japan, India, and many other countries in Asia and the Pacific region have enthusiastically commented on the Soviet proposal to effect extensive cooperation among all the countries in that region for peace and security. This proposal was put forward in the speech made by Soviet leader Gorbachev at Vladivostok on 28 July. It is reported that Mayor Araki of Hiroshima supports the proposal to hold a Pacific meeting in Hiroshima. The people and statesmen of some countries also showed understanding of other Soviet proposals -- proposals to begin talks on reducing the activity of naval fleets in the Pacific Ocean, to resume talks on turning the Indian Ocean into a peaceful region, and to reduce the strength of the armed forces and conventional weapons in Asia on a large scale. News media have also reported that the Soviet Union is willing to talk with China on taking specific measures to reduce the strength of the armies on both sides. In this regard our station observer Mulatov writes as follows:

The central theme of all these Soviet proposals is to eliminate the possibility of a military confrontation and stop activities to strengthen war preparations and to ensure that all countries strive to develop peaceful cooperation and stabilize the peaceful situation in Asia.

In this regard the Soviet Union attaches great importance to its mutual understanding and cooperation with China.

In his speech at Vladivostok Comrade Gorbachev pointed out: history has entrusted the Soviet and Chinese peoples with an exceptionally important mission. A great deal in international development depends on the two largest socialist states. It is precisely from this point that we understand our two nations' heavy responsibility for strengthening security in Asia and in the whole world. The Soviet Union is ready to discuss matters concerning supplementary measures to create an atmosphere of good-neighborliness with China at any time and at any level. In the international arena the extensive cooperation and coordination in many fields between the Soviet Union and China have always served international peace and security. Our past experience has proven this point. Under the present conditions the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations has already created a cheerful political atmosphere in Asia.

However, we now like to analyze the plot used by the imperialists to mislead China. For example, Brzezinski, former U.S. presidential assistant for national security, wrote an article in the latest issue of the U.S. magazine NEWSWEEK expressing his views on China's geopolitical role in the Asian and Pacific region. He shamelessly said: backed by Japan and the United States, China will become an important force contending with the Soviet Union in Asia -- much the way the NATO alliance does in Western Europe. What is this U.S. anticommunist theoretician and practitioner's intent? From his words, we can see that the method of confrontation plays an important role in the imperialist strategies. The imperialists try to use some countries to oppose other countries. However, the Soviet Union adopts an entirely opposite attitude: It calls upon all nations to unite as one to follow the principle of peaceful coexistence in the Asia and Pacific region.

Far East Responses Reported

PM041131 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Telephone conversation between special correspondent Vladimir Lapskiy in the editorial office, own correspondent in Japan Sergey Agafonov in Tokyo, own correspondent in the Indochina countries Yuriy Gatselyuk in Phnom Penh; and own correspondent in China Yuriy Savenkov in Beijing under the rubric "Tokyo, Phnom Penh, Beijing on the Line;" "From the Viewpoint of the Future"]

[Text] The world is at a parting of the ways. Two roads lie before it. One is that of general disarmament and curbing the "nuclear demon," the other is that of continuing the arms race and existing under the daily threat of universal destruction. There is no third road. The Soviet Union persistently proposes taking the road that guarantees mankind a future. This was confirmed once again in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech.

The international section of the speech devoted special attention to Asia and the Pacific region. That region as a whole has not yet been militarized to the same extent as Europe, but the potential for its militarization is very great. The Soviet Union proposes halting that process before it is too late. It advocates building, jointly with others, new, just political and economic relations in Asia and the Pacific and developing good-neighborliness and cooperation. The ideas and proposals contained in M.S. Gorbachev's speech are being studied and commented on widely in that part of the world.

Editorial office: M.S. Gorbachev's speech said a great deal about Japan, our Eastern neighbor and a country which has now been transformed into a power of paramount significance. The political climate in the region largely depends on our relations with it. According to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, a turn for the better has become apparent in those relations. What comments has the Vladivostok speech elicited in Japan, and which aspects have been singled out?

Tokyo: Practically all the major newspapers carried an account of it. There were also several phone calls to the IZVESTIYA Tokyo correspondent's office -- Japanese colleagues were interested in the full text of the speech. N. Solovyev, USSR ambassador to Japan, held a press conference at the Japanese Journalists Club Thursday, which was attended by approximately 200 people. The overwhelming majority of questions concerned the new Soviet proposals.

There is understandably special interest in the expressed idea of holding an Asia-Pacific forum on security problems. Hiroshima was named as a possible venue for such a meeting. Takeshi Araki, mayor of Hiroshima, is now absorbed with preparing to hold the ceremony marking the 41st anniversary of the atom bomb raid. However, he found time to talk with me. "It is probably still too early," he said, "to speak of the agenda of such a forum or the makeup of delegations. But the idea expressed undoubtedly merits very serious attention. This is the second time the Soviet leader has named Hiroshima as a possible venue for a very important international meeting. We regard this as a great honor for our city and as recognition of the fact that Hiroshima is a symbol of the struggle for peace, against the threat of war. We welcome M.S. Gorbachev's proposal and, for our part, will do everything in our power to help realize it."

Editorial office: The CPSU Central Committee general secretary touched on questions of expanding economic ties between the USSR and countries in the Asia and Pacific region. There is tremendous potential in this sphere. What do Japanese business circles think about this?

Tokyo: I turned to Ryoichi Kawai, president of the Komatsu Company -- he headed the Japanese industrialists' delegation at the recent joint conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet Economic Cooperation Committees. This is what he said: "I would call the Soviet leader's addressing of the problems of economic ties and cooperation an important and timely boost to the development of mutually advantageous contacts in this sphere. This is a truly objective necessity. The economic potentials of the Soviet Union and Japan are tremendous, but ties between our countries in the trade and economic sphere clearly do not correspond to them. However, their prospects are extremely broad. In my view, M.S. Gorbachev's speech must be a starting point on this path. It creates the necessary soil and foundations for developing broad business relations in our mutual interests. This can only be welcomed."

It is characteristic that Japanese business circles have greeted with great interest the ideas of creating joint Japanese-Soviet enterprises and developing cooperation in opening up the ocean's borders and in the peaceful use of space.

Editorial office: In recent years, as stated in Vladivostok, there has been an appreciable improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations. M.S. Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union is ready to discuss most seriously with China at any time and at any level questions of additional measures to create an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness. What is the Chinese press writing about this?

Beijing: The Beijing press published a short account of the part of M.S. Gorbachev's speech devoted to international questions. The newspaper RENMIN RIBAO singles out on its front page words about improving Soviet-Chinese relations and our country's readiness to strengthen good-neighbourliness. I have before me the newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO. Its own correspondent in Moscow emphasizes that Soviet people perceive with understanding and respect the aim advanced by the CPC to modernize the country and, in the long term, to build a socialist society worthy of a great people. That part of the speech which mentions the great potential for expanding ties in the economic sphere, as well as a mutually useful exchange in the spheres of culture and education, was not overlooked either. Commentaries in all newspapers point to the USSR's readiness to return six regiments to the motherland from Afghanistan before the end of this year and thereby accelerate a political settlement.

Editorial office: A positive shift has also become apparent in our economic ties with China -- this, too, was mentioned in Vladivostok.

Beijing: Quite right. I will cite an example. The volume of Soviet-Chinese trade more than tripled during 1983-85. That is the quantitative aspect. No less important is the fact that our countries are not competitors on the foreign market. The ranges of export commodities do not overlap. Another important feature of our trade and economic ties is their long-term basis. Incidentally, the agreement between the USSR and PRC Governments on commodity turnover and payments for 1986-90 is the first long-term trade agreement in the entire history of our ties in this sphere.

Editorial office: It has come about historically that the Soviet and Chinese economies have complemented each other. Border trade has always been developed between our countries. The great significance of ties in the border regions was particularly pointed out in Vladivostok.

Beijing: Border trade was resumed between our countries several years ago -- between the Soviet Far East regions on the one hand and Heilongjiang Province and the Nei Mongol Autonomous Region on the other. [paragraph continues]

An accord has been reached on trade between the Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and certain RSFSR oblasts and China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The leading Chinese sociopolitical magazine LIAOWANG recently said that other Chinese provinces and major cities are showing interest in this form of trade. In the sphere of border trade, the magazine writes, China has exported grain, meat, food products, soybeans, corn, and also machines, motorcycles, and refrigerators from the Soviet Union. The conditions for developing trade between border regions of China and the USSR are favorable, the magazine emphasized, and expanding it meets the interests of both sides.

Editorial office: M.S. Gorbachev's speech gave prominent space to the problems of Indochina, particularly Cambodia, and said that the Khmer people themselves must decide their own fate. How has this speech been greeted in Cambodia?

Phnom Penh: I have just had a meeting with Kong Korm, member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and Cambodian first deputy foreign minister. "How much more significant the PRK's successes could have been if our already modest resources and means had not been diverted by the hostile activities of international reaction," he said, "The ideals of peace, good-neighboringliness, and equitable international cooperation have been achieved through suffering by the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Therefore, the peace-loving efforts being made in the international arena by the Soviet Union and its Communist Party are particularly near and dear to our countries. Many problems have indeed accumulated in Southeast Asia. M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech focused world public attention on the need for a comprehensive approach to eliminating the problems that exist in the Asia and Pacific region and improving the situation."

The public of the three fraternal countries of Indochina has shown very intent and genuine interest in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech. It meets with full approval and support in all sections of the three countries' population.

This is what Nguyen Tuan, the veteran Vietnamese writer, told me: "It was with special interest that I read that part of M.S. Gorbachev's speech dealing with the impressive successes of socialist building in the USSR. Creation is always beautiful. An example of socialist creation, founded on concern for the good of the working person, is particularly attractive. All mankind's entire experience confirms that peace is the greatest asset in our life. This is why I wholeheartedly welcomed the international part of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's Vladivostok speech, which is imbued with concern for preserving peace not only in the Pacific region and in Asia but also all over the world."

Positive Responses Highlighted

PM061000 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 86 Second Edition p 4

[Boris Kotov "International Review"]

[Excerpt] All this week the attention of the international public has been focused on M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok, in which he outlined wide-ranging and specific thoughts on the possible nature of the process of shaping international security and peaceful interaction of states in the vast Asian and Pacific region.

This vast expanse, covering almost half of the earth, contains many major states, among them the USSR, the United States, India, China, Japan, Vietnam, Mexico, and Indonesia. It also includes countries like Canada, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and dozens of other states. Taking into account the fact that many of them, particularly those recently liberated from colonial slavery, are targets of active militarist intrigues by imperialist forces which are creating a tense and at times explosive situation in the region and are weaving a network of military bases, one can understand the truly universal interest with which the new Soviet initiatives were welcomed everywhere in the world.

On the Basis of Good Neighborliness

"Omnidirectional diplomatic offensive" -- this how the Paris newspaper LE MATIN described the Soviet leader's speech in Vladivostok. "A most important political speech, "India's press noted for its part. "The USSR'S strategy is aimed at the preservation of peace and stability in Asia," Japan's TOKYO SHIMBUN wrote.

Comprehensively analyzing, assessing, and commenting on the multifaceted peace plan for Asia and the Pacific which was put forward in Vladivostok, observers abroad single out the USSR's desire to primarily impart dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries in the region without exception. Particular attention in this is given to the prospects for developing Soviet-Chinese relations. This is fully understandable. Of course, the issue does not revolve only around the fact that the USSR and China share the longest land border in the world and that the Soviet and Chinese share the longest land border in the world and that the Soviet and Chinese peoples are almost predestined to live next to one another. History has assigned an exceptionally responsible mission to our two great peoples. Much in international development depends on the two largest socialist states.

Under these conditions, particular importance is attached to the confirmation heard in Vladivostok: The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss with China at any time, at any level, and most serious questions concerning additional measures to create an atmosphere of good neighborliness so as to consolidate and advance further the noticeable improvement which has occurred in our relations in the last few years. In particular, there has been positive progress in economic ties. The historically evolved complementarity of the Soviet and Chinese economic offers great opportunities for the expansion of these ties, including in the border regions. An intergovernmental agreement is already being jointly elaborated upon utilizing to joint advantage the abundant resources of the Amur border river basin and on hydroengineering construction work. Here is another indicative fact: A large PRC trade and economic exhibition opened a few days ago in Moscow.

The Soviet Government is drafting a positive answer to the question of assistance in building a railroad to link China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with our Kazakhstan. The USSR has offered the PRC cooperation in space science, which could include the training of Chinese cosmonauts. Great opportunities for reciprocal exchanges between the USSR and China exist in the spheres of culture and education.

The Soviet Union is prepared for the all-around development of relations with the PRC and sincerely desires this. The USSR's steps in this direction are encountering a response in China: XINHUA describes them as "gestures of goodwill."

There has been a keen and broad response to the Vladivostok speech by political and public circles in Japan, in relations with which signs of a change for the better are also noticeable in the USSR. This is ~~particularly~~ ~~natural~~ ~~desirable~~ ~~desireable~~, because the objective location of our two countries in the world is such that it demands intensive cooperation on a firm realistic basis, in an atmosphere of tranquility unburdened by problems of the past. A ~~short~~ ~~long~~ ~~medium~~ ~~term~~ ~~is~~ ~~this~~ direction. A fruitful exchange of visits by foreign ~~friends~~ ~~and~~ ~~place~~ ~~this~~ year. An exchange of top-level visits is on the agenda. ~~With~~ ~~the~~ ~~plan~~ ~~to~~ ~~reports~~ from Tokyo, is positively assessed by Japan's government ~~leaders~~.

According to the same reports, the country's ~~business~~ ~~circles~~ are, for their part, highly interested in the Soviet ~~proposals~~ for economic collaboration and the organization of long-term cooperation in the study and comprehensive utilization of the ocean's resources. The newspaper NIPPON KEIZAI noted in this regard that Japanese businessmen "welcome the strengthening of Japanese-Soviet ties in the economic sphere."

The United States is another of our close neighbors in the Pacific region. Only 7 km separate the Soviet Bolshoy Diomed Island from the U.S. Little Diomede Island.

It was again authoritatively declared in Vladivostok that the Soviet Union advocates peaceful, good neighborly, and equal relations with the United States and mutually advantageous cooperation for which consideration opportunities exist both in the Far East and in the Pacific.

But of course, the most important question in Soviet-U.S. relations today is the question of terminating the arms race which threatens the world with a nuclear catastrophe. It is with this question that people in all continents link their hopes for a turn for the better in world affairs. It is well known that, following last year's summit meeting in Geneva, the USSR submitted an entire package of large-scale proposals in this sphere. But no positive reaction has been forthcoming from Washington.

In order to overcome this marking of time, the USSR submitted new compromise proposals last June. They were outlined in M.S. Gorbachev's letter to President Reagan. The U.S. reply arrived a few days ago. "It provides food for thought," the Soviet leader declared in this regard. "We have started to study it. We will treat it with responsibility and attention."

Commenting on these words, the Western press notes with satisfaction that they testify to the USSR's desire to "continue the dialogue" with Washington on the most burning question of our time and to the fact that the door to a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting "has been far from slammed shut." Moreover, it singles out the idea voiced in Vladivostok: The USSR attaches paramount importance to whether the U.S. counterproposals correspond with the principle of equal security, to whether they will make it possible to come closer to effective joint solutions in the sphere of terminating the arms race and preventing its transfer to outer space.

Wind of Detente

"The wind of detente is blowing from Vladivostok" -- these words were part of the flood of responses from abroad received in the last few days on the teletype machines in editorial offices in Moscow. These words are not accidental. They have a certain symbolism. They were spoken on the eve of 1 August, the 11th anniversary of the day of

the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which marked the beginning of the process of detente and the strengthening of security and cooperation in the European continent. They also apply to the Soviet plan for ensuring collective security in Asia and the Pacific Ocean zone, which was put forward in Vladivostok.

The core of this plan is not only the development and strengthening of bilateral good-neighborly relations between states in this region but also the pooling of their efforts to ease international tension and avert the war danger. The USSR has proposed as a goal -- even if not an immediate one -- a Pacific conference, modeled on the Helsinki conference, with the participation of all the littoral countries. It could be held in Hiroshima, the city which was the first victim of the nuclear madness. In this way, Hiroshima would symbolically take over the baton of peace from the Finnish capital and would become the "Helsinki" of Asia and the Pacific.

The Soviet program for Asia and the Pacific also envisages a whole range of other specific measures and immediate actions. It is primarily aimed at questions of regional settlement: The cooling of political passions which are boiling around young independent Cambodia, which some people would like to push back into the tragic past, the need to normalize Sino-Vietnamese relations, the establishment of mutually acceptable relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN, and the easing of the dangerous tension in the Korean peninsula with a view to embarking on the path toward solving the national problem of the whole Korean people.

Another important direction is to place a barrier across the path of the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in the region. What is necessary for this purpose is, in particular, utmost support for the nuclear-free zone already proclaimed in the South Pacific and the creation of such zones in the Korean peninsula, as the DPRK proposes, and in Southeast Asia. The Soviet program also envisages the start of talks on the reduction of naval activity in the Pacific and the resumption of talks on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

The USSR attaches great importance to the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Asia to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. Finally, the Soviet program put forward the proposal to put on a practical footing the discussion of measures of confidence building and elimination of force in the region.

There was broad reaction in the world to the decision by the Soviet leadership, officially announced in Vladivostok and adopted following consultations with Afghanistan's government, on the return home of limited contingent units of Soviet servicemen temporarily stationed there. The overwhelming majority of mass news media abroad, expressing the opinion of broad political and public circles in their countries, evaluated this decision as convincing proof of the USSR's desire to speed up a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and to give yet another fillip of the Afghan-Pakistani talks which are being held in Geneva. Moreover, it is noted with gratification that, in the event of such a settlement's final elaboration our country is prepared to accelerate the return of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan by agreement with the Afghan leadership.

Nevertheless, it became clearly evident in the last few days that such a turn of events is not to everyone's liking. The Washington organizers of imperialist intervention against Afghanistan and their yes-men in a number of other countries hastened to proclaim that the Soviet decision is a "propaganda trick," thus evidently expecting to justify before the public the continuation of their criminal undeclared war against the revolutionary Afghan people. It is to such lovers of the export of counterrevolution

that the Soviet warning is addressed: If the intervention against the DRA continues, the USSR will not leave its neighbor in the lurch. Our international solidarity with the Afghan people and, likewise, the interests of the Soviet Union's security absolutely rule this out.

The new initiatives for easing tension in Asia and the Pacific region which were put forward in Vladivostok, as the Mongolian newspaper UNEN rightly notes, are a vivid practical materialization of the USSR's foreign policy course, elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress, of creating an all-embracing system of international security. Collective security in the Asian and Pacific region can and must become an important link and an organic part of this system.

Soviet Motives Defended

LD031654 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 3 Aug 86

[International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Boris Andrianov, foreign political commentator of all-union radio; with Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA, and Vadim Borisovich Kassis, editor in chief of the newspaper GOLOS RODINY and the Journal OTCHIZNA]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] This week the world public and mass media have been discussing widely--and even now they are continuing to discuss--the speech given in Vladivostok by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Quite naturally, special attention is being given to the international part of this speech by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Here, for example, is the general reaction of the British press. It points out that concrete proposals were heard in the Soviet leader's speech on ways of solving the key problems of the Asian continent. They were directed first and foremost at achieving peace and good-neighborly relations in that area. The USSR's proposal that the Asian-Pacific area be included in the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security ought to be looked upon as a display of goodwill by the Soviet Union and of its sincerity in the quest for a universal peace, the London newspapers stress. France's LES ECHOS, which represents the business circles, stressed that in Vladivostock the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee once again confirmed the Soviet Union's deep interest in establishing a firm peace in the Pacific region and its desire to make its own contribution to the solution of topical problems in Asia and the Far East.

[Kassis] The reactions that have appeared in the press of the fraternal countries appear even more thorough. The speech of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was imbued with a sense of political responsibility at a high level for the future of civilization and peace on earth, Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG noted. The Bulgarian paper RASOTNICHESKO DELO points out that the detailed, deep, and correct analysis of the state of world affairs, particularly that of the situation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area -- together with the political boldness, clear positions, and realistic, topical initiatives which were contained in the speech, make it a concrete program of practical actions by the Soviet state in this vast and important region of the planet. The Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO says that every Soviet initiative not only exerts an influence upon the world public by force of example but creates the prerequisites for an improvement in the international climate.

[Andrianov] Michael Mayerson, executive director of the American Peace Council, described the wide program for ensuring peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific basin put forward by the Soviet leadership as a document of enormous political importance. He stressed that long ago the need had matured for measures to be taken that were aimed at improving the situation in the Asian and Pacific region, where dangerous conflicts are not dying down and where the U.S. Administration is creating new military bases, siting nuclear weapons and the means for delivering them. All of this, the U.S. public figure pointed out, cannot fail to give rise to serious concern, particularly when one considers that virtually no international agreements aimed at curbing the arms race and at strengthening confidence between peoples have been concluded in Asia.

[Kassis] It is with due consideration for this that the proposal is being put forward -- and it is not even being put forward as an immediate aim -- to hold a Pacific Ocean conference, along the lines of the Helsinki conference, in which all countries that are drawn toward [as heard] the ocean would take part, and to include the Asian and Pacific Ocean region in the general process of setting up an all-embracing system of international security, which was discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress. This problem acquires ever increasing topicality insofar as the role of the Pacific Ocean region in the global system of international relations is growing noticeably. This process, one might say, has become an important manifestation in the political life of the world. At the same time, it has to be said that militarization and the buildup in the military threat in this part of the world is beginning to move at a dangerous speed. The Pacific Ocean is being turned into an arena of military and political confrontation. Suffice it to recall the fact that over the past decade the United States has been building up its armed forces there on a wide scale. Under pressure from the U.S. Administration, the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militarist triangle is being pulled together. The Pentagon has sited nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery in South Korea; and it has put onto Japanese territory U.S. aircraft capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. All of this is giving rise to well founded anxiety on the part of the peoples of the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

[Volkskiy] I would like to dwell on yet another aspect of the situation in the Pacific Ocean basin which was also touched upon in the speech by Comrade Gorbachev. I have in mind the draft for the so-called Pacific community, which was put forward by the United States some time ago jointly with Japan and which was pushed quite hard by their diplomatic services. At first sight this project might indeed appear to some people to be tempting and attractive. Its authors referred to the fact that the Pacific is a major ocean basin, that there are many countries situated on its shores, that technology is developing at a very rapid rate -- in Japan, for example -- and overall to the fact that the 21st century is going to be the century of the Pacific Ocean and that this kind of community is therefore essential in order for this process to have a more or less organized character and to serve the interests of the states which are situated there.

However, this was, so to speak, the outer wrapping of this idea. What was hidden behind it? Behind it there was a whole series of things of a totally different character. In the first place, the plan for this community was permeated with amilitaristic essence; it had a militaristic filling. It was a question of setting up a system of military cooperation in this region -- it is still being set up now. This would be reminiscent of the system set up within NATO; the Pacific community would be a kind of copy of the North Atlantic Bloc -- with amendments to suit local conditions, of course. But that is just one side of the matter. The other side of the matter is the neocolonialist direction of this Pacific community, because, as you know, different kinds of countries are situated on the shores of the Pacific Ocean; developed capitalist states which implement an expansionist policy in this zone, like the United States and Japan; and on the other hand,

developing countries, which have freed themselves only recently from colonialism and which serve as targets for exploitation by the monopolistic circles of the United States and Japan. The draft Pacific community was indeed intended to consolidate this neo-colonialist exploitation, even to move it further forward, and turn it into a permanent factor. Naturally, this was a direct threat to the national interests of Indonesia and the Philippines, say, and to many other states which are situated in this area of the world. But generally speaking, it is now possible to state that the Pacific community venture -- although not a great deal of time has passed since it was put forward -- it is now possible to say that it has not caught on and that it is not catching on, at any rate. It is failing to catch on not just because the states which the United States is trying to include in it are so diverse; it is failing to catch on mainly because this attempt to repeat, so to speak, the experience of the 1940's, when NATO was set up and the military system on which it is based -- well, quite a lot of time has passed since then.

States have acquired a great deal of political experience, and militaristic plans of this kind come up against growing rejection, the more so in view of the fact that they are linked with the consolidation of the unequal position of the developed capitalist states and the former colonial countries in this area of the world. It seems to me that the failure of this idea, which, it has to be said, they are continuing to push under different kinds of dressing -- under the dressing of cooperation in this region, for example -- well, the failure of this idea highlights the correctness of the approach set out in the speech by Comrade Gorbachev and the extent to which it meets the requirements of the peoples of this region.

[Andrianov] Yes, this is a genuinely up-to-date approach to the Asian and Pacific region expressed in the speech by Comrade Gorbachev. It is based upon recognition and understanding of the realities that exist there.

[Volskiy] Realities indeed, which amount to this: that all states, all countries situated there, live according to principles and norms which at any given moment correspond to the level of their political, economic and social development and to the correlation of their internal forces; and which are based upon principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of these countries, on mutual respect, on developing cooperation which would be to the advantage of each and every one of these states. And of course I do not think that we can avoid mentioning here the fact that our Far Eastern region, which lies by the Pacific Ocean, is also a region that has very great promise for the future. Including them actively in a system of international cooperation in the Pacific would have a very important and positive importance not just for our country but for the whole situation that would arise in this region toward the time when we enter the 21st century. The 21st century could indeed, in a certain sense, become the century of the Pacific. But not just that of the Pacific Ocean, of course, of other major world basins, too -- but particularly of this very important and vast region of the world. The approach that was at one time shown by the United States to the North Atlantic when the Atlantic bloc was set up is not appropriate here. Time has shown that this has become obsolete. What is needed here is an approach that was shown in Europe, but at a completely different time, the time of Helsinki.

[Andrianov] There are people in the West who, not unintentionally, try to depict things as though the Soviet Union is now taking a new course in the Asian and Pacific region, as though there's an ulterior motive here because it is dictated, supposedly, by certain concealed interests of Moscow. That kind of interpretation is quite arbitrary, to put it mildly. Behind it lies the desire to confuse an issue that is perfectly clear. Do not those who make such utterances know that the Asian and Pacific direction in our country's foreign policy represents an integral part of the general platform of the CPSU's international activity? It was worked out by the April plenum and the 27th

congress of our party. And it's not a secret for anyone. The Soviet Union proceeds precisely from this in determining its view of the process of forming international security and peaceful interaction in such a vast area of our planet. These are the aims set by our country: international security and peaceful cooperation. And we do not conceal the fact that we see our own interests in the achievement of these objectives, just as the interests of all peoples of the countries of Asia and the Pacific -- and indeed those of all mankind -- are to be found here in equal measure.

[Kassis] Pursuing the line of the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union will first and foremost strive to impart dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries, without exception, that are situated in this region.

And we regard relations with our friends, relations built upon the principles of equality of rights and solidarity, as an inseparable part of overall Asian and Pacific security. At the same time our country is willing to expand relations with other states, including all young and developing participants in the region's political life. The Soviet Union has already established diplomatic relations with several of them.

[Andrianov] A great deal in international development depends, of course, upon the two major socialist states -- the Soviet Union and China. The extremely responsible mission that history has entrusted to the Soviet and Chinese peoples is therefore understandable. And it is quite natural that in his speech in Vladivostok Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev dwelt upon the main thing in our relations with the Chinese People's Republic. Having noted that a noticeable improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations has taken place over recent years, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee confirmed that the Soviet Union is willing to discuss with China questions concerning additional measures to create an atmosphere of good-neighboringness, and to do so at any time, at any level, and in the most serious way. These words did not pass unnoticed in Beijing. XINHUA quoted verbatim the statement of the Soviet leader about this in its report that was published in the central press of the Chinese People's Republic.

[Kassis] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted with satisfaction that positive movement forward had been seen in the economic links between our country and China. In this connection he expressed the conviction that the complementary nature of the Soviet and Chinese economies, something which has come into being in the course of history, provides great opportunities for expanding these links. This conclusion is founded upon a well-known point that is contained in the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th congress of our party, where the following was said: Thinking about the future, it can be said that the reserves for cooperation between the USSR and China are enormous. They are great because cooperation of this kind is in keeping with both countries' interests, because socialism and peace, the things that are dearest for our peoples, are indivisible.

[Andrianov] Yes, the 27th CPSU Congress has again confirmed that the Soviet Union strives consistently to improve relations with the PRC and to expand cooperation between the two countries in different fields in the interests of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples. This has a positive effect in concrete affairs, particularly with regard to Soviet-Chinese trade and economic relations which have been enlivened. It is noteworthy that the annual volume of Soviet-Chinese trade has risen by more than nine times over the past 5 years. Last year it amounted to the sum of r1,605,000,000. And this makes up approximately 80 percent of the value of the maximum trade-turnover achieved by our countries at the end of the 1950's.

[Kassis] But by all accounts, Boris Vasiliyevich, even this level is not now regarded as a maximum limit: no doubt all our comrades remember that the first long-term agreement on trade-turnover and payments in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, covering the period from 1986 to 1990, has been signed between our countries. Over that 5-year period the volume of trade, on a balanced basis, is to amount to approximately r12 billion. Furthermore, it is planned that this shall amount to r3 billion in the final year of the 5-year period; in other words, nearly twice as much as last year. As you see, some quite substantial movement has been mapped out in this field.

[Andrianov] The sphere of our cooperation with China is extremely wide. It is not confined solely to the field of trade and economic relations. Furthermore, it is clear that this is a course toward the stable development of this cooperation upon a basis of equality and mutual advantage, toward putting it onto a long-term and planned foundation. All this is in keeping with the radical interests of the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic and will undoubtedly encourage an improvement in the international situation, the raising of the role of socialism in world affairs, and the strengthening of the cause of peace and stability in Asia and in the Pacific region.

Importance of 'New Approach'

PM051500 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Aug 86 p 9

[Fedor Burlatskiy "Observer's Opinion": "Vladivostok: The Onset of the Turnabout"]

[Text] The Asian orientation of our country's foreign policy has been marked by major actions of worldwide significance. M.S. Gorbachev's speeches in the Far East have made an enormous impression on international public opinion.

Today no one can be surprised by peace loving words and gestures. They abound in speeches by virtually all leaders of modern states. Those who sincerely strive for the easing of international tension and disarmament. And also those who in fact pursue exactly the opposite course. Such words are now a mandatory ingredient of routine diplomacy and commonplace propaganda. Only actions and real steps of a crucial nature have any real value.

Just look at the effect exerted on the international climate and the disposition of forces in the world by the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. This act not only revealed the true nature of Soviet policy but also cast a bright beam of light upon the adversaries of disarmament. Like a catalyst in a chemical solution, it gathered together the efforts of different and diverse forces opposing a new round of the suicidal arms race. It is no accident that the anniversary of the tragic events on 6 August 1945, when the first atom bomb was exploded over Hiroshima, was marked by an explosion of protest against the continuing nuclear tests in Nevada.

The Soviet initiatives for detente and cooperation in Asia gave a new and impressive example of major political actions in the international arena. They include the announcement of the withdrawal of six regiments of the Soviet armed contingent from Afghanistan. The point goes even beyond the impressive nature of this figure and concerns a major contribution to the process of a political settlement in this painful spot of international life.

This unilateral act is a kind of invitation to joint actions by all interested countries. It is calculated to assist in the cessation of hostile actions from outside against the peoples of this country. It is to encourage the policy of national reconciliation inside Afghanistan.

The Soviet proposal for a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in this region to the level of reasonable sufficiency is an important step along the path of improving relations in Asia. The question concerning the withdrawal of a significant part of Soviet troops from Mongolia is currently being examined jointly with the Mongolian People's Republic leadership. The USSR is prepared to discuss with the PRC specific steps aimed at commensurate [sorazmernyy] reductions of the level of ground forces. New conditions are now emerging for the development of political cooperation in this region, and the Soviet initiative gives a powerful fillip to this process.

The USSR's new approach toward many problems of its Asian policy offers favorable opportunities for the development of cooperation with those countries, relations with which have been at a standstill. This applies primarily to Soviet-Japanese relations.

We expect much from the exchange of visits at the top level by leaders of the USSR and Japan and from the constructive talks on major economic projects and the development of business contacts with that country. Of course, the traditional friendly relations with India and other countries in the region lie at the basis of Asian cooperation.

And here is the main point. Our country's new political actions pursue clearly defined and far-reaching goals. To prevent the occurrence in Asia of what happened in Europe -- the split of the region's countries into hostile blocs. To lay here a foundation for ensuring collective security in Asia and the Pacific zone. This is the aim of the Soviet proposal to hold a Pacific conference with the participation of all of the ocean's littoral countries. Such a conference can and must become an event of equal importance to the 1975 Helsinki conference, whose 11th anniversary was celebrated 1 August.

Now that different countries are assessing the results of that conference and we hear from Washington voices of criticism, groundless accusations, and disappointment, our country emphasizes yet again the historic importance of the process which began in Helsinki. Despite all the stumbling and contradictions in subsequent international development, it is indeed from the "spirit of Helsinki" that all peace-loving forces draw inspiration and hope in the struggle for the triumph of the easing of international tension.

And so, we have grounds to expect that, given a favorable development of international affairs, Vladivostok will become an important landmark in the process of detente and cooperation in Asia and throughout the Pacific region.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

PM070917 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

[Text] There has been a wide response throughout the world for the new Soviet peace initiatives set forth by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his 28 July speech in Vladivostok. The Soviet Union has again demonstrated its desire for an end to the arms race, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the quest for political solutions to regional conflicts, and called upon the Asian-Pacific countries to cooperate for the sake of peace and international security.

This was discussed on 6 August at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

In his statement, Comrade Kapitsa, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, recalled that in Asia, the world's biggest continent, since World War II there have been more military conflicts than anywhere else, and there have been two major wars -- in Korea and Vietnam. They were unleashed by American imperialism. Serious military conflicts are taking place even now, in particular those against Afghanistan and Cambodia. Nuclear weapons are being accumulated and new military bases set up in the Asian-Pacific region. The U.S. Navy is equipped with new types of armaments. The forces of imperialism nurture plans for creating new aggressive blocs.

At the same time, the deputy minister continued, this region accounts for half of the world's trade. By the end of the millenium, the region will occupy an important place in the development of world political and economic ties. The world's biggest states, with the largest populations, belong to the region. Taking account of all this, the Soviet Union consistently and doggedly struggles for the conversion of the Asian-Pacific region into a region of peace and stability. It advocates its inclusion in the general process of the creation of a comprehensive system of international security.

To this end, the Soviet Union strives for an improvement of bilateral relations with the countries of the region. A high level of friendly ties has been established with India, whose contribution to the struggle for peace is held in high esteem by the Soviet people. Much has been done in the area of economic and trade contacts with the PRC. The USSR is also ready for an improvement of Soviet-Chinese political relations. It has been observable of late that relations between the USSR and Japan have been getting warmer. We also support an expansion of cooperation with the United States. Importance is attached to relations with the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand and the island states. Another thrust of our policy is the unblocking of all crisis situations in Asia, so that in the future the countries of the Asian-Pacific region may go forward to their own Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation. The Soviet Union is in favor of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the region, the reduction of navies and bases and the expansion of trade relations. Replies were also given to other questions from journalists.

Importance of Asia-Pacific Region

LD071832 Moscow World Service in English 1431 GMT 7 Aug 86

[From the "Focus on Asia"; Viktor Glazunov commentary]

[Text] The world today widely discusses the Soviet proposals concerning the Asian and Pacific region. Radio Moscow political commentator Glazunov touches on some of the questions that are being raised. This is what he writes:

The Soviet Union has always given attention to the region. One reason is because the bigger part of its territory is in Asia and it is interested in the peaceful development of that area. When analyzing the comments made on the Soviet proposals what strikes the eye are the attempts of the United States to minimize their importance and proclaim them mere propaganda. Actually, this has become a sort of reflex to every Soviet initiative on the part of certain circles in the United States.

Incidentally, it would be well if the United States itself engaged in such propaganda. Washington, for instance, hastened to declare as propaganda the decision of the Soviet Union to return from Afghanistan part of the Soviet military contingent which is there at the request of the Afghan Government. They say this concerns only several thousand Soviet servicemen. For many years, however, talks have been going on to reduce the armed forces and arms in central Europe. At the first stage it is proposed to withdraw from central Europe also several thousand American servicemen, along with Soviet soldiers. Washington, however, does all it can to avoid such an agreement. What prevents the United States, using its terminology, from making such a propaganda move? Simply because it does not want to give a political signal and to demonstrate its political will to reduce military arsenals in central Europe. As for the Soviet Union, by returning from Afghanistan part of its troops, it gives a political signal and demonstrates its readiness to work for a political settlement of the situation in and around Afghanistan. And that is the way all people who want a political settlement view the Soviet step. And when such a settlement is attained it would be possible to speed up the return of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Commentators and politicians also single out the desire of the Soviet Union to make more dynamic its bilateral relations with all countries of Asia and the Pacific, without exception. Special attention is given to the prospects of Soviet-Chinese relations. Viktor Glazunov writes:

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are big powers and nuclear powers. History has placed an exceedingly responsible mission on them. Much in the development of world affairs depend on them. Relations between the two socialist countries have been advancing in a very complicated way. There were periods of friendship and there were periods when relations were very cool. In recent years there has been a noticeable improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet Union wants them to be really goodneighborly relations. It is ready to discuss with the People's Republic of China, at any time and any level, everything that will help attain that. And not only the people of the two countries would stand to gain from that, but also others.

Nevertheless, certain elements across the ocean keep wondering whether the Soviet Union doesn't seek, as they say, to play the China card against the United States. Incidentally, the United States is inclined to ascribe to the Soviet Union the desire to set the countries in Europe and other parts of the world against America. But that is not so. The Soviet Union understands very well that attempts to exclude the United States from settling international problems are not only groundless but harmful.

The Soviet Union is for the United States taking an active part in solving problems in the Asian and Pacific region. After all, the United States belongs to the region and has political and economic interests there. And bearing in mind the United States' military presence in the region, it becomes quite clear that it is impossible to settle the problems of the area without the United States. And when proposing a Pacific conference similar to the one in Helsinki, the Soviet Union, of course, lists the United States among its participants.

There has been extensive response to the idea of holding a Pacific conference similar to the one in Helsinki. Can the Pacific region gain from Europe's experience? Viktor Glazunov writes:

It is not a matter of copying everything that went on at the conference on security and cooperation in Helsinki. It is the European method of a collective approach to solving problems that is important. Equally important is how the question is put: that there should be collective security and cooperation and not confrontation. Of course, not everything is going along smoothly in Europe. Nevertheless, the Helsinki process of a dialogue, talks, and agreements works in Europe. It is a factor of stability and reduces the likelihood of arms conflicts. And wouldn't such a process also help things in Asia and the Pacific?

On the whole, the Asian and Pacific region is not militarized to such an extent as Europe. And that should be viewed as a certain advantage, but a rather relative one. The potentials for militarization in the region are tremendous and the consequences are exceedingly dangerous, bearing in mind the complex situation in that part of the world. So, while it is not yet [too] late, it is necessary to put up a barrier first of all on the way of spreading and building up nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific.

When advancing its proposals on security and cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region the Soviet Union is ready to discuss the constructive proposals of other countries. The region has experience in the Nonaligned Movement. Many constructive ideas and proposals have already been put forward there. For instance, the proposals on setting up peace zones and nuclear-free zones.

The Soviet Union believes that the wind of relaxation of tension from Vladivostok which people now talk about will speed up the joint search for ways and means of ensuring security and starting cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

U.S. Deployments, DPRK Proposals

SK091110 Moscow International Service in Korean 0930 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Talk by Station Commentator Mikhailov: "Let Us Engage in Cooperation, not Confrontation"]

[Text] The role Asia and the Pacific have played in resolving the basic problems of world development and international stability has been constantly growing in recent years. The Soviet Union, which is not only a European country but also a big Asian country, has inevitably considered the complex situation that has developed in the vast Asia and Pacific region in carrying out its foreign policy.

The sources of military confrontation and tension have not disappeared in various areas of this region, from the Korean peninsula to the Near East of the Persian Gulf. As various facts have shown, major sources of disputes, mistrust, and enmity and major obstacles to the peaceful development of countries in Asia and the Pacific are the acts of the United States and other imperialist countries attempting to establish their military and political control in this region. The United States has deployed in the Pacific region armed forces second to those in Western Europe in strength.

This has aroused deep suspicions among peace-loving social circles.

The armed forces that the United States is maintaining in the Pacific consists of 474,000 soldiers, 149 warships, and more than 11,000 fighters. More than 2,000 nuclear bombs are deployed in the warships and submarines of the U.S. 3d and 7th Fleets operating in the Pacific. The military and political cooperation among Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul has assumed a more dangerous, aggressive nature with the passage of time.

Washington's desperate efforts have actually turned South Korea into an important springboard on the Asian Continent for the United States. The treaty of mutual defense that Washington signed with Seoul in 1953 has given it the right to station an unlimited number of soldiers in South Korea and to deploy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and any other weapons there.

In response to the U.S. policy of aggravating tension, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have adopted the policy of defending peace and establishing relations of friendship in Asia and the Pacific. The new peace-loving proposal by the Soviet Union has recently attracted world attention. In a speech in Vladivostok on 28 July, Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, revealed a grand plan to have countries in Asia and the Pacific participate in establishing an overall international security system. The Soviet Union considers the question of solving regional disputes important in the security of all of Asia. For example, the Soviet leader expressed his conviction that it is possible not only to alleviate dangerous tension on the Korean peninsula but also for all Korean people to begin embarking upon a road toward resolving national problems. Adopting measures to oppose the expansion and strengthening of nuclear forces in Asia and the Pacific is also part of the Soviet proposal. The Soviet Union reiterated its promise not to increase the number of medium-range missiles in its Asian region and supported the plan to turn the South Pacific into a nuclear-free zone.

The DPRK, an important Soviet ally in carrying out the policy of peace and security in Asia, has constantly asserted that Korea be peacefully and democratically reunified, and has adamantly faced the aggressive, cunning tricks of the South Korean reactionaries and the U.S. imperialists. The policy of our country is to strengthen in friendship with socialist Korea and to develop multilateral relations.

The Soviet Union considers the efforts by the Korean people in making the situation on the Korean peninsula a sound one part of the struggle for security, peace, and social advance.

Sincere dialogue, which the DPRK proposes, best corresponds to the interests of the Korean people. We can also cite the recent proposal by the DPRK to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as an important contribution to the work of alleviating military tension in Asia and the Pacific. In this way, the Soviet Union and the DPRK are clear models in successful cooperation for peace and security.

[Word indistinct] Facts show the Soviet plan to comprehensively deal with the problem of security in Asia has created a profound sensation among the world and the peoples in Asia and the Pacific. They have more clearly understood with the passage of time that a peaceful future can be realized only when all democratic and peace-loving forces, who hope that relations of friendship are established, unite their efforts.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM111417 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Program for Peace in Asia"]

[Text] Exceptional interest has been aroused everywhere by our country's large-scale new peace initiative -- the program for ensuring international security and peaceful collaboration in the Asian-Pacific region, formulated in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech.

The Asian-Pacific avenue of the Soviet Union's foreign policy is an integral part of the general platform of the CPSU's international activity elaborated by the April plenum and the 27th party congress. The all-embracing system of international security which the 27th congress advocated setting up is inconceivable without the normalization of the situation in such a vast region as Asia and the Pacific, where billions of people live and where there are dozens of states seeking to resolve the complex problems posed by life. But all these problems are dominated by one problem which is urgent and acute for every region of the world -- the problem of survival, of averting the threat of a devastating nuclear war. Our country calls for its resolution.

The USSR does not seek any special rights or privileges in the Asian-Pacific region. Jointly to build new, just interstate relations in that part of the world too -- that is what it seeks. The direction in which the socioeconomic and political development of this vast area of the planet proceed and the processes that prevail in relations between countries there will largely determine the fate of world peace.

We must not forget the historical fact that it was in Asia that U.S. imperialism perpetrated the crime of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and that two major wars were unleashed -- in Korea and Vietnam. Here, too, there have been more of the so-called "minor" military conflicts than anywhere else. Imperialist militarist forces have not given up trying to extend the network of their military bases here, to bring in nuclear weapons, and to involve the region's countries in their own military preparations.

It should also be borne in mind that whereas the Helsinki process operates -- well or poorly -- in Europe and helps in the quest for ways of strengthening mutual understanding and security, in the Asian-Pacific region this does not happen, or scarcely happens.

The militarization of the Pacific region has yet to reach the same scale as in Europe. But it is proceeding at an increasing pace, and the consequences could prove extremely dangerous. It is not yet too late to hamper this turn of events and prevent Asia and the Pacific from being turned into an arena of military-political confrontation. The real prerequisites exist for making Asia and the Pacific a region of peace and good-neighboringness. The Soviet Union calls for these prerequisites to be brought into play.

Socialism, which is a paramount factor for world peace, has firm positions in that part of the world. [paragraph continues]

The USSR, the SRV, Mongolia, the DPRK, and other countries have repeatedly put forward concrete proposals whose implementation would not only improve the situation in the region, but increases the chances of preserving and strengthening international peace.

History has entrusted a highly responsible mission to the peoples of the USSR and China. The potential exists for its successful fulfillment, but this potential must be exploited to the full. The CPSU and the Soviet people sincerely seek to establish better relations with our neighbor -- socialist China. We are prepared at any time, at any level, to discuss with the PRC in the most serious fashion questions of additional measures to create an atmosphere of good-neighborliness.

The peoples of Asia have not stood aloof from the high road of international relations in the past. Suffice it to recall the principles of "Panch Shila" or Bandung. Now, too, the countries of that part of the world are putting forward some ideas, for instance, on economic cooperation. The only important thing is for such projects not to be imposed from outside and for them to be free from the notorious "bloc strategy."

The concept of nonalignment was born in Asia. After gathering great strength, it led out into the political arena of the modern world a movement which has drawn more than 100 states into its orbit. The acknowledged leader of this movement is the great India. The USSR's friendly relations with India are a major stabilizing factor on an international scale.

Soviet people are pleased to note the signs of a change for the better in the USSR's relations with Japan. The cause of peace will gain if this change becomes a fact. The USSR is prepared to extend ties with Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries. Any state which seeks peace and cooperation will meet with understanding and support from the USSR.

The new Soviet initiative is realistic in nature. It contains concrete proposals on a regional settlement in Southeast Asia; on preventing the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific; on reducing the activity of navies in the Pacific; on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Asia; and on transferring to a practical plane the discussion of confidence-building measures and the nonuse of force in that region. The announcement of the forthcoming return home from Afghanistan of six Soviet regiments met with a major positive response in the world. This act will be part of the political settlement of the Afghanistan situation which the Soviet Union consistently advocates. Of course, in this connection, the cessation and nonresumption of imperialist interference in the DRA's internal affairs must be ensured.

The Soviet proposal on including the Asian-Pacific region in the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security is further convincing evidence that the advance of initiatives which are of strategic, key significance for the normalization of the world situation was and is a characteristic feature of the foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Examples of such initiatives are the Soviet program for eliminating nuclear weapons and the proposals aimed at preventing the spread of the arms race to space, the course of building a genuinely peaceful Europe, and the enhancement of Europe's role in international affairs.

For a year the Soviet Union has unilaterally adhered to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. All who value mankind's future in the nuclear age warmly support the USSR's very important action for peace. [paragraph continues]

Everywhere there is a rising wave of indignation at Washington's course of continuing nuclear explosions.

The socialist policy of peace consistently pursued by our country accords with mankind's vital interests. Hence, there is growing support for it by all the planet's forces of peace and reason. The people of the earth need have no doubt: The land of the Soviets will continue consistently to follow this, the only correct path.

'Anti-Soviet Hysteria'

PM121302 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[V. Korionov "Rejoinder": "Why Are They Lying?"]

[Text] Some people in the West are getting fits of anti-Soviet hysteria again.

The "Gallant Eagle-86" exercises, during which troops from the U.S. Armed Forces Central Command (CENTCOM) had been rehearsing possible operations for conducting combat actions on the territories of Near East or Asian countries, had hardly ended in the California desert when General G. Crist of the U.S. Marines, who was heading the exercises, stated: "Soviet military interests have moved to Southwest Asia."

"The Russians are not only striving to expand their sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean but have also created a military potential for doing so," the general threatens. And with a feigned tremble in his voice he goes on to report that the troops under his command "would not be able to repulse a full-scale offensive by Soviet forces in Southwest Asia."

In Britain there are also press organs which have decided to play their part in the attempts to distort the USSR's peace policy in Asia and the Far East. Thus, the newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES disconcerted its readers with this "discovery": "The long arm of Soviet influence has reached into the South Pacific in order to hoist the red flag there in thoroughly prepared positions." There have been similar wailings in certain other publications.

But these are sheer ravings, the reader will exclaim. And he would, of course be right. But the fact is that it is by no means an accident that these ravings have appeared in the Western press at this precise time. The outburst of anti-Sovietism has been triggered by a desire to besmirch the USSR's new large-scale initiative which urges peoples and states to build peaceful and just relations in Asia and the Pacific. This initiative has produced an enormous response worldwide. Mankind has received further convincing proof of the responsibility with which the Soviet Union approaches the cause of normalizing the situation both in Europe and in Asia.

For many years the urgent problems of the enormous Asia-Pacific region stagnated; moreover, people tried to solve them by using confrontation and refused to examine them around the negotiating table. The new Soviet initiative opens up a fundamentally different prospect for the Asian and Pacific countries.

The USSR, many foreign press organs note, is removing the tension from problems out of which reactionary circles build artificial barriers to dialogue. Moscow, France's LE MATIN writes, has "shown Washington that the Soviet Union is capable of solving complex problems of international relations, preferring to keep precisely to a political settlement of these problems."

But this switch will in no way suit those forces in the imperialist camp which are gambling on the militarist fist and are interested in artificially maintaining tension in Asia and the Pacific. In Washington, the magazine AFRIQUE-ASIE writes, there is a mounting "fear that the antinuclear disease will infect the entire Pacific." The U.S. militarists are clearly worried about the fate of the network of 160 bases and military centers encompassing the immense region from Hawaii to the Philippines, from Japan and South Korea to Australia.

The United States has strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO writes. In order to defend them, the Reagan administration has developed and is implementing a special policy line aimed at intensifying and expanding political, economic, and military links with U.S. partners in this part of the world. Moreover, to all appearances, main stress is being placed on building up U.S. military presence in the Far East and implementing a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The new Soviet peace initiatives are consonant with the sentiments and aspirations of the Asian and Pacific peoples, who thirst for peace and security, and accord with their vital national interests. It is natural that the forces of reason and common sense are supporting these initiatives. This drives the adherents of confrontation crazy. That is why they are again conjuring up the specter of the "Soviet military threat" and piling one wild lie upon another. But they will not succeed in achieving their dark goals.

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RELATED ISSUES

GENSCHER LEAVES USSR WITHOUT MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH

OW230626 Beijing XINHUA in English 0554 GMT 23 Jul 86

[*"Roundup: Genscher's Moscow Trip"--XINHUA headline*]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jul (XINHUA)--Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher ended his 3-day visit to Moscow Tuesday without achieving major breakthroughs in bilateral relations and disarmament despite the joint call for more arms control efforts.

Over the past few months, the Soviet Union, deadlocked in arms control talks with the United States, has impressed the world with a number of major diplomatic moves in Europe.

The Soviets appointed new ambassadors to Britain, France and Federal Germany, received in Moscow Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and French President Francois Mitterrand and sent Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to London.

Despite its preoccupation with Washington, Moscow well understands the importance of western Europe at a time when the process of disarmament is more complicated than ever before.

The Soviet Union, which has long described western Europe as "the lab of detente," only hopes to restore, through stepped-up diplomacy in the region, the kind of atmosphere it enjoyed in the 1970s, or at least make a dent in Washington's NATO alliance.

Following its major disarmament initiatives, including the latest "interim proposal" on strategic weapons, Moscow appeared to be trying to make more room for maneuvering in arms reduction negotiations.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev last month unveiled the "interim" proposal on nuclear weapons, which offers a separate deal with medium-range missiles and acceptance of laboratory research of U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI) if both superpowers would abide by the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty for 15 more years.

Speaking at a news conference at the end of his stay, Genscher said the latest Soviet arms control offers could be a "basis" for progress in disarmament talks.

Genscher also indicated that during his visit efforts were made to urge the superpowers to the summit table this year.

However, substantial differences on arms control and other major issues remain between the Soviet Union and western Europe.

During Genscher's visit, Gorbachev did not hesitate to criticize Federal Germany for its role in the U.S. SDI project.

Federal Germany was the second European country to sign up to participate in SDI after Britain.

Soviet officials, apparently unhappy with Bonn's arms control stance, complained to Genscher that Federal Germany is not consistent in its arms control policies and is not doing enough for disarmament.

The Bonn government has "potentialities for contributing to arms limitation and reduction. It could, specifically, say a weighty word in favor of ending nuclear weapons test," TASS news agency quoted Soviet officials as saying.

Like the talks between the Soviet Union and France and Britain, Genscher's trip has not yet resulted in big progress in disarmament, but it may give a push to the process of arms control and the holding of another Soviet-U.S. summit later this year. Before leaving the Soviet Union Genscher said he would brief U.S. officials on his talks during a trip to Washington following the Moscow tour.

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END